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The  Skill-Base  Hvpothesis 
Since  the  1970s  a  persistent  feature  of  the  U.S.  economy  has  been  increasing  income 
inequality,  to  the  point  where  the  United  States  now  has  the  most  unequal  distribution  of 
income  among  the  advanced  industrial  economies.  Sustainable  prosperity  -  the  spreading 
of the  benefits  of  economic  growth  to  more  and  more  people  over  a  prolonged  period  of  time 
__ appears  to  have  become  an  elusive  objective.  At  the  same  time,  in  the  late  1990s  after 
more  than  two  decades  of  intense  competitive  challenges,  the  United  States  retains 
international  leadership  in  a range  of  science-based  industries  such  as  computer  electronics 
and  pharmaceuticals  as  well  as  in  service  sectors  related  to  such  things  as  finance  and 
food.  The  U.S.  economy  appears  capable  of  innovation,  but  incapable  of  sustainable 
prosperity. 
Are  innovation  and  equality  inherently  in  opposition  to  one  another?  In  a  previous  report  to 
the  Levy  Institute,  co-authored  with  Mary  O’Sullivan,  we  hypothesized  that  the  coexistence 
of  innovation  and  inequality  in  the  U.S.  economy  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  reflects  a 
systematic  bias  of  ma’or  U.S.  corporations  against  making  innovative  investments  in  broad 
and  deep  skill  bases. 
I  Rather,  these  corporations,  which  exercise  inordinate  control  over 
the  allocation  of  resources  and  returns  in  the  economy,  are  choosing  to  invest,  and  are  best 
able  to  innovate,  in  the  production  of  goods  and  services  that  use  narrow  and  concentrated 
skill  bases  to  develop  and  utilize  technology. 
Why  are  “skill  bases”  important  to  the  economy?  They  form  the  foundation  on  which  people 
engage  in  collective  and  cumulative  -  or  organizational  -  learning,  which  is  in  turn  central  to 
the  process  of  economic  development.  Case-study  evidence  suggests  that  the 
manufacturing  industries  in  which  the  U.S.  economy  has  been  most  severely  challenged  by 
high-wage  foreign  competition  -  industries  such  as  automobiles,  consumer  electronics, 
machine  tools,  and  commodity  semiconductors  -  are  those  in  which  innovation  and 
sustained  competitive  advantage  demand  investments  in  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases.  If 
the  “skill-base  hypothesis”  is  valid,  then  it  may  well  be  that  innovation  and  equality  can  go 
hand  in  hand.*  From  a  policy  perspective,  the  relevant  issue  is  how  business  enterprises 
can  be  induced  to  make  innovative  investments  in  broad  and  deep  skill  bases. 
The  skill-base  hypothesis  adds  an  important  dimension  to  American  debates  on  the  relation 
between  investments  in  “technology”  and  sustainable  prosperity.  On  one  side  have  been 
those  who  stress  the  weakened  innovative  capabilities  of  the  U.S.  economy  in  international 
competition.3  They  have  called  for  the  U.S.  government  and  businesses  to  allocate  more 
resources  to  education,  training,  research,  and  cooperative  investment  projects  that  can 
support  the  United  States  in  making  a  competitive  response.  These  arguments  assume, 
often  more  implicitly  than  explicitly,  that  these  innovative  responses  will  promote  sustainable 
prosperity  in  the  United  States. 
On  the  other  side  have  been  those  who  argue  that  income  inequality  cannot  be  blamed  on 
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Dertouzos,  Richard  K. Lester,  and  Robert  M. Solow,  and the MIT Commission  on Industrial 
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international  competition  but  rather  on  the  employment  impacts  of “new  technology”4.  The 
volume  of world  trade,  they  argue,  is  not  large  enough  to  have  a significant  impact  on  the 
distribution  of  income  in  the  United  States.  If  the  United  States  has  problems  keeping 
people  employed  at high  wages,  it is because,  for a given  level  of investment,  technologies 
of  the  computer  age  do  not  create  the  same  quantity  and  quality  of  employment 
opportunities  for  Americans  as  did  the  technologies  of  the  past.  Income  inequality  has 
grown,  they  argue,  because  new technologies  displace  employment  opportunities  that  used 
to be well  paid.  Pay attention  to raising  the  levels  of both  investment  and  relevant  skill  in the 
U.S. economy,  and the  income  distribution  will  improve. 
The  skill-base  hypothesis  views  both  international  competition  and  technological  change  as 
important  determinants  of the  distribution  of income.  But the  hypothesis  is embedded  in  a 
theory  of  innovation  and  economic  development  in  which  the  impacts  of  international 
competition  and  technology  on  income  distribution  depend  on  corporate  investment 
strategies.  Across  U.S.  industrial  corporations,  these  strategies,  and  the  investment  in skill 
bases  that  they  entail,  are  in  turn  influenced  by  American  institutions  of  corporate 
governance  and  corporate  employment.5  The  rise  of  powerful  international  competition 
based  on investments  in broader  and  deeper  skill  bases  may lead  U.S. corporations  to seek 
to remain  innovative  by investing  in technologies  that  only  require  investments  in narrow  and 
concentrated  skill  bases. 
Powerful  support  for the  skill-base  hypothesis  can  be found  in the  experience  of Japanese- 
U.S.  industrial  competition  over  the  past  few decades.  Japan  has  taken  on and  surpassed 
the  United  States  in  many  industries  in  which  it  was  the  previous  world  leader.  The 
foundations  of  Japanese  success  in  international  competition,  I  shall  argue,  were 
investments  in  broad  and  deep  skill  bases  to  generate  organizational  learning.  The 
problems  of both  innovation  and  equality  in the  United  States  in the  1980s  and  1990s  have 
not  been  inherent  in technology.  Rather  the  problems  derive  from  corporate  strategies  to 
develop  and  utilize  technology. 
U.S.  corporations,  I contend,  have  been  investing  in narrow  and  concentrated  skill  bases  in 
a world  of international  competition  in which  innovation  has  increasingly  come  from  investing 
in  broad  and  deep  skill  bases.  If  the  skill-base  hypothesis  is  correct,  the  problem  of 
reversing  the  trend  toward  income  inequality  in the  United  States  goes  much  deeper  than 
growth  policies  or  industrial  policies.  It  requires  transformation  of  the  way  industrial 
corporations  are governed  and the way  people  are employed 
Oraanizational  lntenration 
Almost  all of the  major  industrial  corporations  in the  U.S. economy  in the  post-World  War  II 
era  made  investments  in  managerial  learning  from  the  early  decades  of  the  twentieth 
century,  if  not  before.  Many  of  the  productive  and  competitive  advantages  of  these 
investments  in managerial  organization  still  accrued  to these  corporations  decades  after the 
particular  individuals  involved  in these  collective  learning  processes  had  left  the  corporate 
scene. 
In  comparative  international  perspective,  U.S.  industrial  corporations  were  not  unique  in 
building  their  managerial  organizations  into  formidable  sources  of  sustained  competitive 
4 See  Paul  Krugman  and  Robert  Lawrence,  “Trade,  Jobs,  and Wages,”  Scientific  American,  April 
1994. 
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advantage.  What  made  U.S.  industrial  corporations  unique  among  their  counterparts  in  the 
advanced  economies  was  their  dedication  to  a  strategy  of  taking  skills,  and  hence  the 
possibilities  for  craft  learning  --  much  less  corporate  learning  --  off  the  shop  floor.6  This 
process  of transforming  skilled  craft  work  into  “semi-skilled”  operative  work  was  a  prolonged 
one,  constrained  as  it  was  by  the  development  of  new  technology  through  managerial 
learning.  But,  as  reflected  in  the  distinction  between  “salaried”  and  “hourly”  personnel,  the 
strategy  of  relying  exclusively  on  the  managerial  organization  for  the  development  of  new 
productive  capabilities  has  been,  throughout  the  twentieth  century,  a  distinctive 
characteristic  of  U.S.  industrial  development. 
The  American  corporate  strategy  of  confining  organizational  learning  to  those  employed 
within  the  managerial  structure  enabled  the  United  States  to  become  the  world’s  leading 
industrial  power  during  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century.7  On  the  basis  of  this 
leadership,  U.S.  industrial  corporations  were  able  to  provide  high  pay  and  stable 
employment  to  not  only  managerial  employees  but  also  shop-floor  workers,  whether  they  be 
skilled  or  semi-skilled. 
Over  the  past  few  decades,  however,  powerful  international  competitors  have  arisen  who 
have  developed  productive  capabilities  by  integrating  managers  and  workers  into  their 
organizational  learning  processes.  The  hierarchical  segmentation  between  managers  and 
workers  that  the  American  “managerial  revolution”  entailed  became  a  major  institutional 
barrier  to  making  the  types  of  investments  in  organizational  learning  required  to  sustain 
prosperity  in  the  U.S.  economy.  In  an  era  of  intense  international  competition  in  which 
sustained  competitive  advantage  went  to  those  enterprises  and  nations  that  made 
investments  in,  and  integrated,  the  organizational  learning  of  both  managerial  and  shop-floor 
personnel,  the  investment  strategies  of  most  U.S.  industrial  corporations  that  focused  only 
on  managerial  learning  fell  short. 
The  competitive  problem  that  has  faced  U.S.  industrial  corporations  is  that,  over  time  for  a 
particular  product,  the  innovation  process,  of which  the  organizational  learning  process  is  its 
social  substance,  has  become  increasingly  collective  and  cumulative.  Organizational 
learning  has  become  increasingly  collective  because  innovation  --  the  generation  of  higher 
quality,  lower  cost  products  --  depends  on  the  integration  of  an  ever-increasing  array  of 
specific  productive  capabilities  based  on  intimate  knowledge  of  particular  organizations, 
technologies,  and  markets.  Organizational  learning  has  become  increasingly  cumulative 
because  the  collective  learning  that  an  organization  has  accumulated  in  the  past 
increasingly  forms  an  indispensable  foundation  for  the  augmentation  of  organizational 
learning  in  the  present  and  future. 
The  increasingly  collective  and  cumulative  character  of  organizational  learning  means  that, 
for  a  particular  product,  an  innovative  investment  strategy  is  one  that  entails  investments  in 
broader  and  deeper  skill  bases  --  divisions  of  labor  that  extend  further  down  the 
organizational  hierarchy  and  involve  more  functional  specialties.  The  investments  in  skill 
bases  are  not  simply  investments  in  the  learning  of  large  numbers  of  individuals  performing 
a  wide  variety  of  functions.  For  these  investments  in  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases  to 
generate  higher  quality,  lower  cost  products  requires  organizational  integration,  a  set  of 
social  relations  that  provides  participants  in  a complex  division  of  labor  with  the  incentives  to 
6 Wrlliam  Lazonick  and  Mary  O’Sullivan,  “Big  Business  and Skill  Formation  in the Wealthiest  Nations: 
The  Organizational  Revolution  in the Twentieth  Century,”  in Alfred  D. Chandler,  Jr., Franc0  Amatori 
and Takashi  Hikino,  Bio Business  and the Wealth  of Nations,  Cambridge  University  Press,  1997; 
William  Lazonick,  Comoetitive  Advantaoe  on the Shop  Floor,  Harvard  University  Press,  1990. 
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cooperate  in contributing  their  skills  and efforts  toward  the  achievement  of common  goals. 
At  any  point  in  time,  the  technological  possibilities  and  organizational  requirements  of  the 
innovation  process  vary  markedly  across  industries  in terms  of the  extent  of the  skill  base  in 
which  the  innovating  enterprise  must  invest.  In  industries,  such  as  pharmaceuticals,  in 
which  value-added  comes  mainly  from  research,  design,  and  marketing,  narrow  and 
concentrated  skill  bases  of  scientists,  engineers,  and  patent  lawyers  remain  sufficient  for 
generating  higher  quality,  lower  cost  products.  In such  industries,  U.S. industrial  enterprises 
have  been  able  to  remain  world  leaders.  But  in  industries,  such  as  automobiles,  where 
value-added  comes  mainly  from  manufacturing  processes  that  combine  a complex  array  of 
physically  distinct  components,  international  competitive  challenges  have  been  based  on 
investments  in  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases.  The  investments  in  organizational  learning 
occur  not only  within  corporate  management  structures  but also  on the  shop  floor  and  in the 
vertical  supply  chain.  In  those  industries  in  which  international  competition  demands 
investments  in  such  broad  and  deep  skill  bases,  once-dominant  U.S.  industrial  enterprises 
have  lost substantial  competitive  advantage. 
In  the  U.S.  automobile  industry,  American-based  companies  have  regained  some  of  the 
markets  they  have  lost  -- or at least  have  stemmed  the  loss  of market  share.  The  skill-base 
hypothesis  posits  that  the!  have  done  so by investing  in broader  and deeper  skill  bases  than 
was  previously  the  case.  In  responding  to  these  competitive  challenges,  moreover,  the 
organizational  problem  that  has  faced  U.S. industrial  enterprises  over  the  past  few decades 
has  gone  beyond  the  hierarchical  segmentation  between  managers  and  workers.  Even 
within  the  managerial  structure  --  the  traditional  locus  of  organizational  learning  in  U.S. 
enterprises  -  organizational  integration  appears  to  have  given  way  to  two  types  of 
segmentation  which  we call  functional  and strategic. 
Compared  with  both  the  integrated  organizational  structures  of foreign  competitors  and  the 
integrated  managerial  structures  that  characterized  the  most  successful  U.S.  companies  in 
the  past,  organizational  learning  within  the  managerial  structures  of  U.S.  enterprises  has 
been  limited  by the  functional  segmentation  of different  groups  of technical  specialists  from 
one  another.  Specialists  in  marketing,  development,  production,  and  purchasing  may  be 
highly  skilled  in  their  particular  functions,  but  relative  to  their  counterparts  abroad,  in  U.S. 
enterprises  they  tend  to  respond  to  incentives  that  lead  them  to  learn  in  isolation  from  one 
another.  Functional  segmentation  makes  it  difficult  if  not  impossible  for  such  isolated 
specialists  to  solve  complex  manufacturing  problems  that  require  collective  and  cumulative 
learning. 
In  addition,  in  comparative  and  historical  perspective,  a  distinctive  characteristic  of  U.S. 
industrial  enterprises  since  the  1960s  has  been  the  strategic  segmentation  of  those  top 
managers  who  control  enterprise  resources  from those  lower  down  the  managerial  hierarchy 
on whom  the  enterprise  has  relied  for organizational  learning.  In allocating  vast  amounts  of 
resources,  top  managers  of  major  U.S.  industrial  corporations  have  increasingly  lost  the 
incentive  to  remain  cognizant  of the  problems  and  possibilities  for  organizational  learning 
within  the  enterprises  over  which  they  exercise  control.  Within  a  particular  enterprise, 
tendencies  toward  hierarchical,  functional,  and  strategic  segmentation  may  be  mutually 
reinforcing,  thus  making  it all the  more  difficult  for  an enterprise,  or group  of enterprises,  to 
invest  in  organizational  learning  once  they  have  embarked  on  the  organizational- 
segmentation  path. 
* I am currently engaged in a comparative  study  of organizational  integration  and competitive 
advantage  in the automobile  industry,  supported  by the Center  for Global  Partnership,  in 
collaboration  with  the  International  Motor Vehicle  Program. 
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The  skill-base  hypothesis  seeks  to  test  these  propositions  concerning  the  growing 
importance  of  hierarchical,  functional,  and  strategic  integration  for  attaining  and  sustaining 
competitive  advantage,  and  the  increasing  tendency  toward  organizational  segmentation 
along  these  three  dimensions  in  U.S.  industrial  corporations  in  historical  and  comparative 
perspective.  The  skill-base  hypothesis,  and  the  theoretical  perspective  on  innovation  and 
economic  development  in which  it is embedded,  derives  from  our  historical  and  comparative 
analyses  of  the  role  of  organizational  integration  in  shifts  in  international  competitive 
advantage.g  The  empirical  evidence  required  to test the  hypothesis  requires  must  be derived 
from  in-depth  analyses  of  the  investment  strategies,  organizational  structures,  and 
competitive  performance  of  particular  companies  based  in  different  nations  that  have 
engaged  in head-to-head  competition  in particular  industries. 
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to motivate  such  a research  agenda  by drawing  on some  of the 
findings  of a now vast  range  of literature  on the  interaction  of organization  and technology  in 
U.S.-Japanese  industrial  competition.  This  evidence,  much  of  it  deriving  from  the 
experiences  of management  consultants  and case  studies  by business  academics,  provides 
substance  to  the  skill-base  hypothesis.  In  this  paper,  I  shall  focus  on  differences  in 
hierarchical  integration  and  organizational  learning  in Japanese  and American  enterprises.  I 
shall  argue  that  understanding  hierarchical  integration  of technical  specialists  and  production 
operatives  forms  an  indispensable  foundation  for  understanding  the  functional  integration  of 
technical  specialists  themselves  -  a subject  that  now  dominates  much  of the  management 
literature  on  technological  competition.  Absent  from  this  paper  will  be  a  discussion  of 
strategic  integration  and  segmentation,  a  subject  that,  in  relation  to  the  skill-base 
hypothesis,  has  been  treated  at length  elsewhere,  and  that  provides  the  analytical  interface 
between  issues  of  corporate  governance  and  organizational  learning.”  In  what  follows, 
therefore,  I  shall  be  concerned  with  the  social  structures  that  generate  organizational 
learning  rather  than  with  the  social  structures  that  allocate  resources  to  building  different 
types  of skill  bases. 
Organizational  Learning 
If  there  is  one  nation  that  has  challenged  the  United  States  for  international  industrial 
leadership  in  the  last  half  of the  twentieth  century,  that  nation  is  Japan.  In  1950  Japan’s 
GDP  per capita  was  only  20 percent  of that  of the  United  States;  in  1992 90 percent.”  The 
Japanese  challenge  had  come,  moreover,  not  in  those  industries  in  which  American 
companies  were  weak  or that  they  had  neglected.  On  the  contrary,  the  challenge  came  in 
’ William Lazonick, Business Oroanization and the  Mvth  of the  Market  Economv,  Cambridge  University 
Press,  1991;  Mary  O’Sullivan,  Innovation,  Industrial  Development  and Corporate  Governance,  Ph.D. 
dissertation,  Harvard  University,  June  1996; Lazonick  and O’Sullivan,  “Big  Business  and Skill 
Formation”;  William  Lazonick  and  Mary  O’Sullivan,  “Organization,  Finance,  and  International 
Competition,”  Industrial  and  Corporate  Channe,  5, 1, 1996; Lazonick  and O’Sullivan,  “Corporate 
Governance  and  Corporate  Employment.” 
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Contests  for Corporate  Control,  Oxford  University  Press,  forthcoming;  Lazonick  and O’Sullivan, 
“Corporate  Employment  and  Corporate  Governance”;  William  Lazonick  and  Mary  O’Sullivan, 
“Finance  and  Industrial  Development:  Part I, the United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom,”  Financial 
Historv  Review,  4,  1, 1997; and  “Finance  and  Industrial  Development,  Part II, Japan  and Germany,” 
Financial  Historv  Review,  4, 2, 1997. 
”  Angus  Maddison,  “Explaining  the  Economic  Performance  of Nations,  1820-I  989,”  in William  J. 
Baumol,  Richard  R. Nelson,  and  Edward  N. Wolff,  eds. Converoence  of Productivitv:  Cross-National 
Studies  and  Historical  Evidence,  Oxford  University  Press,  1994, 22. 
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industries  such  as  automobiles,  electronics,  and  machine  tools  in  which  the  United  States 
had  attained  a seemingly  invincible  position  as  the  world’s  leading  mass  producer. 
Since  the  1980s  much  has  been  written  about  the  institutional  and  organizational  sources  of 
Japanese  competitive  advantage.  Social  institutions  such  as  lifetime  employment  and 
cross-shareholding  and  organizational  practices  such  as  total  quality  management  and 
consensus  decision-making  have  been  critical  elements  of  Japan’s  phenomenal  rise  from 
the  ashes  of  defeat  after  World  War  II.  But  these  institutions  and  organizations  would  not 
have  generated  the  so-called  Japanese  economic  miracle  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  had 
Japan  not  already  possessed  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  war  an  accumulation  of 
technological  capabilities. 
Japan  had  been  accumulating  capabilities  in  mechanical,  electrical  and  chemical 
technologies  since  the  late  nineteenth  century  when  the  Japanese  “managerial  revolution” 
had  begun.  At  the  time  of  the  Meiji  Restoration  in  1868,  Japan  had  little  in  the  way  of 
modern  industrial  capabilities.”  Under  the  slogan  “Rich  Nation,  Strong  Army”,  the 
Restoration  government  implemented  a  strategy  for  industrial  development  that  was  heavily 
dependent  on  borrowing  knowledge,  technologies,  and  even  institutions  from  abroad.13  In 
the  first  half  of  the  187Os,  private  and  public  interests  set  up  institutions  of  higher  education 
-  most  notably  Keio  University,  the  Institute  of  Technology  (later  part  of  Tokyo  Imperial 
University),  and  the  Commercial  Law  School  (which  became  Hitotsubashi  University)  --  to 
supply  key  personnel  to  an  innovative  industrial  econom  .14  By  the  1880s  Japan  had  a 
steady  supply  of  both  indigenous  graduates  and  teachers. 
IY 
Large  numbers  of  university  graduates  were  lured  into  industry,  with  the  zaibafsu  (including 
their  affiliated  industrial  enterprises)  taking  the  lead?  From  1900  to  1920,  for  example,  the 
employment  of  graduate  engineers  increased  from  54  to  835  at  Mitsui  and  from  52  to  818  at 
Mitsubishi.”  These  highly  educated  personnel  were  not  only  eagerly  recruited  but  also  well 
paid  by  the  companies  that  employed  them.  In  addition,  companies  often  incurred  the 
considerable  expense  of  sending  these  employees  abroad  for  varying  lengths  of  time  to 
acquire  more  industrial  experience.” 
During  the  interwar  period  the  overall  development  strategy  of  the  Japanese  economy 
”  See Tessa  Morris-Suzuki,  The  Technolooical  Transformation  of Japan,  Cambridge  University  Press, 
1994. 
l3 Richard  Samuels,  “Rich  Nation,  Strono  Army”:  National  Securitv  and the Technoloqical 
Transformation  of Japan,  Cornell  University  Press  1994; D. Eleanor  Westney,  imitation  and 
Innovation,  Harvard  University  Press,  1987. On the development  of a financial  system  for industrial 
development,  see William  Lazonick  and  Mary  O’Sullivan,  “Finance  and  Industrial  Development:  Part 
II”. 
l4 Johannes  Hirschmeier  and Tsunehiko  Yui,  The  Development  of Japanese  Business,  second  edition, 
George  Allen  & Unwin,  1981,166;  Janet  Hunter,  A Concise  Dictionan/  of Modern  Japan,  University  of 
California  Press,  1984, 47;  Etsuo  Abe,  “Shibusawa,  Eiichi  (1840-1931),”  in Malcolm  Warner,  ed., 
International  Encvclopedia  of Business  and Manaoement,  Routledge,  1996, 4451. 
l5 Shin’ichi  Yonekawa,  ‘University  Graduates  in Japanese  Enterprises  before  the  Second  World  War,” 
Business  Historv  26, July  1984,  pp. 193-218;  Ryoichi  Iwauchi,  “The  Growth  of White-Collar 
Employment  in Relation  to the  Educational  System,”  and  H. Uchida,  “Comment”,  in Tsunehiko  Yui 
and  Keichiro  Nakagawa,  eds.,  Japanese  Manaoement  in Historical  Perspective,  University  of Tokyo 
Press,  1989, 83-108. 
l6 Yonekawa,  “University  Graduates  in Japanese  Enterprises.” 
”  Uchida,  “Comment,”  108. 
”  Iwauchi,  “Growth  of White-Collar  Employment,”  99; Hirschmeier  and Yui,  Development  of Japanese 
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became  increasingly  dominated  by  the  investment  requirements  of  militarization  and 
imperial  expansion.  Relying  heavily  on the zaibatsu,  Japan  devoted  considerable  resources 
to building  capabilities  in mechanical,  electrical,  and chemical  engineering.  In the  immediate 
aftermath  of World  War  II,  as the  Allied  Occupation  engaged  in the  dissolution  of the  once- 
powerful  zaibatsu,lg  Japanese  scientists  and  engineers  organized  to  seek  new  ways  to 
develop  and  utilize  their  capabilities. 
In  1946  they  formed  the  Japanese  Union  of  Scientists  and  Engineers  (JUSE),  an 
association  devoted  to promoting  the  nation’s  technological  development  through  education, 
standard  setting,  and  the  diffusion  of  information.  Influenced  by  U.S.  occupation  officials 
versed  in  statistical  quality  control  (SQC)  techniques  that  the  United  States  had  used  for 
military  production  during  the  war,  JUSE  focused  on the  application  of quality  control  in  an 
economy  based  on  production  for  commercial  markets.  In  1949  JUSE  established  the 
Quality  Control  Research  Group  (QCRG),  which  included  participants  from  academia, 
industry,  and  government. 
The  following  year  JUSE  sponsored  an  eight-day  seminar  on  SQC  by  Dr.  W.  Edwards 
Deming,  a  physicist  who  had  been  working  for  the  U.S.  government  developing  the 
sampling  methods  for  SQC.”  These  techniques  were  used  to  monitor  mass-produced 
output  for  systematic  deviations  from  “quality”  standards  as  a  prelude  to  controlling 
(identifying  and  correcting)  quality  problems.  Deming’s  lectures  were  well  received  as was 
the  volume  of  these  lectures  that  JUSE  promptly  published.  The  author  donated  the 
royalties  from  the  book  to  JUSE,  which  in turn  used  the  funds  to establish  the  now-famous 
Deming  Application  Prize,  awarded  annually  since  1951  to  an  industrial  company  for  its 
achievements  in the  application  of quality  control  (QC) methods.*’ 
One  of the  key  figures  in  applying  QC  methods  to  Japanese  industry  was  Kaoru  Ishikawa, 
an engineering  professor  at the  University  of Tokyo.  Starting  in 1949,  under  the  auspices  of 
QCRG,  lshikawa  began  teaching  the  QC  Basic  Course  to  industrial  engineers,  using 
translated  British  and American  texts.  “After  conducting  the first  course,”  lshikawa  recalled, 
it  became  clear  to  us that  physics,  chemistry,  and  mathematics  are  universal  and 
are  applicable  anywhere  in the  world.  However,  in the  case  of quality  control,  or 
in anything  that  has  the  term  ‘control’  attached  to it, human  and  social  factors  are 
strongly  at work.  No matter  how  good the American  and  British  methods  may  be, 
they  cannot  be imported  to Japan  as they  stand.  To  succeed,  we  had  to create  a 
Japanese  method.“** 
Ishikawa,  along  with  others,  developed  the  Japanese  method  in  the  1950s  through  their 
direct  involvement  with  Japanese  manufacturing  companies,  particularly  in  the  fledgling 
automobile  industry.23 
”  T.  Adams  and  lwao  Hoshii,  A Financial  Historv  of the New Japan,Kodansha  International,  1972, 23- 
25.  See also  T. Bisson,  Zaibatsu  Dissolution  in Japan,  University  of California  Press,  1951; Eleanor 
Hadley,  Antitrust  in Japan,  Princeton  University  Press,  1970. 
”  Kaoru  Ishikawa,  What  is Total  Qualitv  Control?  The  Japanese  Wav,  Prentice-Hall,  1985,  16 
2’ lzumi  Nonaka,  “The  Development  of Company-Wide  Quality  Control  and Quality  Circles  at Toyota 
Motor  Corporation  and  Nissan  Motor  Co. Ltd., in Haruhito  Shiomi  and  Kazuo  Wada,  eds.,  Fordism 
Transformed:  The  Development  of Production  Methods  in the Automobile  Industry,  Oxford  University 
Press,  1995. 
22  Ishikawa,  What  is Total  Quality  Control?,  16-17 
23  Nonaka,  “Development  of Company-Wide  Quality  Control,”  143.  See also Shigeru  Mizuno, 
Companv-Wide  Total  Qualitv  Control,  Asian  Productivity  Organization,  1984. 
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What  was  different  about  Japanese  conditions  that  made  it  necessary  to  “create  a 
Japanese  method”?  And  how  by  the  1970s  and  1980s  did  the  Japanese  method  that  was 
created  become  the  world’s  most  powerful  manufacturing  approach  for  setting  new 
standards  of  high  quality  and  low  cost?  In  particular,  how  did  Japanese  manufacturing  for 
mass  markets  differ  from  the  system  that  Americans  had  previously  developed  in  the  first 
half  of  the  twentieth  century  when  U.S.  industry  established  itself  as  the  world’s  leading 
mass  producer? 
The  fundamental  difference  between  the  Japanese  and  American  organization  of  mass 
production  was  on  the  shop  floor.  The  American  system  of  mass  production  that  dominated 
the  world  economy  by  the  mid-twentieth  century  was  based  on  the  production  of  long  runs 
of  identical  units  by  expensive  special-purpose  machines  tended  by  “semi-skilled” 
operatives.24  The  transformation  of  the  high  fixed  costs  of  these  mass-production 
technologies  into  low  unit  costs  of  final  products  required  the  cooperation  of  these  shop- 
floor  workers  in  the  repetitive  performance  of  narrow  manual  functions  needed  to  maintain 
the  flow  of  work-in-progress  through  the  interlinked  mechanical  system. 
The  American  machine  operatives  themselves  were  not  involved  in  either  monitoring  the 
quality  of  work-in-progress  or  searching  for  solutions  to  quality  problems  in  the 
manufacturing  process.  By  design,  they  were  excluded  from  the  process  of  organizational 
learning  that  generated  the  American  system  of  mass  production.25  Reflecting  the 
American  practice  of  confining  organizational  learning  to  the  managerial  structure,  and 
developing  technologies  that  displaced  the  need  for  skill  on  the  shop  floor,  quality  control 
had  evolved  in  the  United  States  as  a strictly  managerial  function. 
Leading  American  mass  producers  were  willing  and  able  to  provide  greater  employment 
security  and  higher  wages  to  shop-floor  workers  to  ensure  their  cooperation  in  keeping  pace 
with  the  expensive  high-speed,  special-purpose  machinery.  These  companies,  that  is, 
established  incentives  to  gain  the  cooperation  of  operatives  in  the  uti/;zation  of  technology. 
But  the  managers  of  these  companies  were  unwilling  to  grant  these  operatives  any  role  in 
the  development  of  technology.  Rather  they  confined  such  organizational  learning  to  the 
managerial  structure.  Indeed  in  the  American  companies  considerable  managerial  learning 
was  devoted  to  organizing  work  and  developing  mass-production  technologies.26 
In  the  post-World  War  II  Japanese  automobile  industry,  companies  like  Toyota  and  Nissan 
did  not  have  the  luxury  of  long  runs.  Reflecting  Japan’s  low  level  of  GDP  per  capita,  in  1950 
the  entire  Japanese  automobile  industry  produced  31,597  vehicles,  which  was  about  the 
volume  that  U.S.  companies  produced  in  one  and  a  half  days.*’  In  that  year,  Nissan 
accounted  for  39  percent  of  production  and  Toyota  37  percent,  while  for  the  industry  as  a 
whole  84  percent  of  the  vehicles  produced  were  trucks.28  As  production  increased  over  the 
course  of  the  1950s  with  cars  becoming  a  larger  proportion  of  the  total,  Nissan  or  Toyota 
had  to  produce  an  increasing  variety  of  vehicles  to  survive.  In  responding  to  these  demand- 
24  On the emergence  of American  mass production,  see David  Hounshell,  From the American  Svstem 
to Mass  Production,  1800-1932,  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1984. 
25  On the  historical  origins  of this  hierarchical  segmentation,  see Lazonick,  Competitive  Advantaoe  on 
the  Shop  Floor,  ch. 7-9. 
26  Ibid.; William  Lazonick,  “Rethinking  ‘Taylorism’:  Organization  of Innovation  for the Twenty-First 
Century,”  INSEAD,  photocopy,  June  1997. 
27  Michael  Cusumano,  The  Japanese  Automobile  Industry:  Technoloqv  and  Manaqement  at Nissan 
and Tovota,  Harvard  University  Press,  1985, 75, 266, 
28  Cusumano,  Japanese  Automobile  Industry,  75. 
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side  conditions,  therefore,  these  companies  had  no  possibility  of  achieving  low  unit  costs  by 
simply  adopting  American  mass-production  methods. 
On  the  supply-side,  over  the  course  of  the  twentieth  century  Japanese  industry  had 
developed  capabilities  that  could  now enable  companies  like Toyota  and  Nissan  to develop 
and  utilize  technology  in  a  profoundly  different  way.  These  companies  could  draw  on  a 
sizable  supply  of highly  educated  and  experienced  engineers.  Many  Toyota  employees,  for 
example,  had  accumulated  relevant  technological  experience  over  the  previous  decades 
working  for  the  enterprise  group  when  it  was  Japan’s  leading  producer  of  textile 
machinery.”  In  addition,  the  automobile  industry  was  able  to  attract  many  engineers  who 
had gained  experience  in Japan’s  aircraft  industry  before  and during  the war.3o 
Before  the  war,  moreover,  many  Japanese  companies  had  integrated  foremen  into  the 
structure  of managerial  learning  so that  they  could  not only  supervise  but  also  train  workers 
on  the  shop  floor.  Whereas  in the  United  States,  the  foreman,  as  “the  man  in the  middle”, 
served  as  a  buffer  between  the  managerial  organization  and  the  shop  floor,  in  Japan  the 
foreman  was  an  integrator  of managerial  and shop-floor  learning.  From  the  late  nineteenth 
century,  a  prime  objective  of  U.S.  managerial  learning  had  been  to  develop  machine 
technologies  that  could  dispense  with  the  skills  of  craft  workers  on  the  shop  floor.  In 
contrast,  with  an  accumulation  of  such  craft  skills  lacking  in  Japan,  the  problem  that  had 
confronted  technology-oriented  managers  from  the  Meiji  era  had  been  to  develop  skills  on 
the  shop  floor  as part of a coordinated  strategy  of organizational  learning. 
The  rise  of  enterprise  unions  in  the  early  1950s  both  reflected  and  enhanced  the  social 
foundations  for this  hierarchical  integration.  During  the  last  half  of the  1940s  dire  economic 
conditions  and  democratization  initiatives  gave  rise  to  a militant  labor  movement  of white- 
collar  (technical  and  administrative)  and  blue-collar  (operative)  employees.  The  goal  of the 
new  industrial  unions  was  to implement  “production  control”:  the takeover  of idle factories  so 
that  workers  could  put  them  into  operation  and  earn  a  living.31  As  an  alternative  to  the 
“production  control”  strategy  of militant  unions,  leading  companies  created  enterprise  unions 
of white-collar  and  blue-collar  employees.  In  1950  under  economic  conditions  deliberately 
rendered  more  severe  by the  Occupation’s  anti-inflationary  “Dodge  line”,  companies  such  as 
Toyota,  Toshiba,  and  Hitachi  fired  militant  workers  and  offered  enterprise  unionism  to  the 
remaining  employees.  The  post-Korean  War recession  of 1953 created  another  opportunity 
for more  companies  to expel  the  militants  and introduce  enterprise  unionism.  The  continued 
and  rapid  expansion  of  the  Japanese  economy  in  the  “high-growth  era”  ensured  that 
enterprise  unionism  would  become  an entrenched  Japanese  institution3* 
The  prime  achievement  of  enterprise  unionism  was  “lifetime  employment”,  a  system  that 
gave  white-collar  and  blue-collar  workers  employment  security  to the  retirement  age of 55 or 
2g  William  Mass  and Andrew  Robertson,  “Indigenous  Innovation  and Technology  Transfer:  Toyoda 
Enterprises  and  Platt  Brothers,”  Business  and  Economic  History,  2nd ser., 25, 2, 1996. 
JO  See  Kazuo  Wada.  “The  Emergence  of the ‘Flow  Production’  Method  in Japan,”  in Shiomi  and Wada, 
Fordism  Transformed.  - 
31  Joe  Moore,  Japanese  Workers  and the Struqqle  for Power,  1945-1947,  University  of Wisconsin 
Press,  1983; Andrew  Gordon,  The  Evolution  of Labor Relations  in Japan:  Heavv  Industrv,  1853- 
1955,  Harvard  University  Press,  1985, 343; N. Hiwatari,  “Japanese  Corporate  Governance 
Reexamined:  The  Origins  and  Institutional  Foundations  of Enterprise  Unionism,”  paper  prepared  for 
the  Conference  on  Employees  and Corporate  Governance,  Columbia  University  Law School, 
November  22,  1996. 
32  Gordon,  Evolution  of Labor  Relations  in Japan  ch.  10; Cusumano,  The  Japanese  Automobile 
Industry;  David  Halberstam,  The  Reckoninq,  Morrow,  1986, Pt .3; Hiwatari,  “Japanese  Corporate 
Governance”. 
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60.  Foremen  and  supervisors  were  members  of  the  union,  as  were  all  university-educated 
personnel  for  at  least  the  first  ten  years  of  employment  before  they  made  the  official 
transition  into  “management”.  Union  officials,  who  were  company  employees,  held  regularly 
scheduled  conferences  with  management  at  different  levels  of  the  enterprise  to  resolve 
issues  concerning  remuneration,  work  conditions,  work  organization,  transfers,  and 
production.33 
These  institutional  conditions  supported  the  integration  of  shop-floor  workers  into  a 
company-wide  process  of  organizational  learning.  Top  managers  had  ultimate  control  over 
strategic  investments,  and  technical  specialists  designed  products  and  processes,  typically 
on  the  basis  of  technology  borrowed  from  abroad.  But,  given  these  managerial  capabilities, 
the  unique  ability  of  Japanese  companies  to  transform  borrowed  technology  to  generate 
new  standards  of  quality  and  cost  depended  on  the  integration  of  shop-floor  workers  into  the 
process  of  organizational  learning. 
Through  their  engagement  in  processes  of  cost  reduction,  Japanese  shop-floor  workers 
were  continuously  involved  in  a  more  general  process  of  improvement  of  products  and 
processes  that,  by  the  1970s  enabled  Japanese  companies  to  emerge  as  world  leaders  in 
factory  automation.  This  productive  transformation  became  particularly  important  in 
international  competition  in  the  1980s  as  Japanese  wages  approached  the  levels  of  the 
advanced  industrial  economies  of  North  America  and  Western  Europe.  During  the  1980s 
and  1990s  influenced  as  well  by  the  impact  of  Japanese  direct  investment  in  North  America 
and  Western  Europe,  many  Western  companies  have  been  trying,  with  varying  degrees  of 
success,  to  implement  Japanese  high-quality,  low-cost  mass-production  methods. 
Especially  since  the  1980s  a  huge  English-language  literature  has  emerged  on  Japanese 
manufacturing  methods,  much  of  it  written  by  industrial  engineers  with  considerable 
experience  as  employees  of,  or  consultants  to,  manufacturing  companies  in  Japan  and  the 
West.  In  addition,  there  is  a  growing  body  of  academic  research  on  the  subject,  although  it 
tends  to  focus  more  on  functional  integration  than  on  hierarchical  integration.  My  purpose 
here  is  to  summarize  this  body  of  evidence  to  make  the  case  that,  in  comparison  with  the 
once-dominant  American  mass  producers,  a  fundamental  source  of  Japanese 
manufacturing  success  has  been  the  hierarchical  integration  of  shop-floor  workers  in  the 
process  of  organizational  learning.  I  shall  also  indicate  how,  within  Japanese  companies, 
hierarchical  integration  contributed  to  the  generation  of  higher  quality,  lower  cost  products 
as  part  of  a  process  of  organizational  learning  that  included  integration  across  specialized 
functions. 
In  a  comprehensive  account  of  Japan’s  manufacturing  challenge,  Kiyoshi  Suzaki,  a  former 
engineer  at  Toshiba  who  then  turned  to  consulting  in  the  United  States,  contrasts  the 
operational  and  organizational  characteristics  of  a  “conventional”  (traditional  American) 
company  and  a  “progressive”  (innovative  Japanese)  company  in  the  use  of  men,  materials, 
and  machines  in  the  production  process  (see  Table  1).34 In  the  generation  of  higher  quality, 
lower  cost  products,  the  integration  of  Japanese  shop-floor  workers  into  the  process  of 
organizational  learning  contributed  to  1)  the  more  complete  utilization  of  machines,  2) 
superior  utilization  of  materials,  3)  improvements  in  product  quality,  and  4)  factow 
automation.  In  summarizing  the  ways  in  which  hierarchical  integration  contributed  to  these 
innovative  outcomes  in  Japan,  I shall  indicate  how  and  why  Japanese  practice  differed  from 
the  hierarchical  segmentation  of  shop-floor  workers  that  was,  and  still  largely  remains,  the 
33  See, for example,  Koichi  Shimokawa,  The  Japanese  Automobile  Industry:  A Business  History, 
Athlone,  1994. 
34  Kiyoshi  Suzaki,  The  New  Manufacturinq  Challenae,  Free  Press,  1987. 
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norm  in American  manufacturing 
Table  1.  Operational  and  Organizational  Characteristics  of  American  and 
Japanese  Manufacturing 
Source:  Adapted  from  Kiyoshi  Suzaki,  The New Manufacturina Challenoe, Free Press,  1987, 233. 
l  Utilization  of Machines 
In  the  decade  after  the  war,  the  Japanese  pioneered  in  cellular  manufacturing  -  the 
placement  of a series  of vertically-related  machines  in a U-shape  so that  a worker,  or team 
of workers,  can  operate  different  kinds  of machines  to  produce  a completed  unit  of output. 
Used  particularly  for  the  production  of  components,  cellular  manufacturing  requires  that 
workers  perform  a variety  of tasks,  and hence  that  they  be multi-skilled. 
The  Japanese  system  differed  from  the  linear  production  system  used  in the  United  States 
in  which  shop-floor  workers  specialized  in  particular  tasks,  passing  the  semi-finished  unit 
from  one  specialized  worker  to  the  next.  Historically,  this  fragmented  division  of  labor 
resulted  from  the  successful  strategy  of American  managers  in the  late  nineteenth  century 
to  develop  and  utilize  mechanized  technologies  that  could  overcome  their  dependence  on 
craft  contractors  who  had  previously  controlled  the  organization  of  work.35  To  better 
supervise  the  “semi-skilled”  workers  who  operated  the  new  mechanized  technologies, 
American  managers  then  sought  to confine  adversarial  shop-floor  workers  to  narrow  tasks. 
After  the  rise  of industrial  unionism  in the  1930s  shop-floor  workers  used  these  narrow  job 
definitions  as  a foundation  for wage-setting,  thus  institutionalizing  this  form  of job  control  in 
collective  bargaining  arrangements. 
35  David  Montgomery,  The  Fall of the  House  of Labor, Cambridge  University  Press,  1987. 
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The  prevalence  of adversarial  bargaining  and job  control  only  served  to increase  the  resolve 
of most  U.S. corporate  managers  to keep skill  and initiative  off the  shop  floor  in the  decades 
after  World  War  II.  Meanwhile,  developing  and  utilizing  the  capabilities  of the  multi-skilled 
shop-floor  worker  in  a  myriad  of  ways,  Japanese  companies  created  new  standards  of 
quality  and  cost.  This  continuous  improvement,  which  the Japanese  called  kaizen,36 enabled 
Japanese  companies  to  outcompete  the  Americans,  even  in their  own  home  markets,  even 
as Japanese  wages  rose  and  the yen strengthened  in the  1980s  and  1990s. 
With  the  need  to  use  mass-production  equipment  to  produce  a  variety  of  products  in  the 
1950s  Japanese  companies  placed  considerable  emphasis  on reducing  setup  times.  Long 
setups  meant  excessive  downtime,  which  meant  lost output.  Once  set  in motion,  the  search 
for  improvements  often  continued  over  years  and even  decades.  For example,  in  1945 the 
setup  time  for  a  lOOO-ton  press  at  Toyota  was  four  hours;  by  1971  it was  down  to  three 
minutes.  A ring-gear  cutter  at Mazda  that  took  more than  six  hours  to set  up  in  1976 could 
be set  up in  10 minutes  four  years  later.37 
By  the  1980s  the  extent  of  the  market  that  Japanese  manufacturers  had  captured  meant 
that  small-batch  production  was  no  longer  the  necessity  it had  been  30  years  earlier.  But 
the  ability  of these  companies  to do what  the Japanese  call “single-digit”  (under  ten  minutes) 
setups  enabled  them  to  use  the  same  production  facilities  to  produce  a  wide  variety  of 
customized  products.  Single-digit  setups  had  become  a  powerful  source  of  international 
competitive  advantage. 
The  reduction  of  setup  times  involved  the  redesign  of  fixtures,  the  standardization  of 
components,  and  the  reorganization  of work.  Shop-floor  workers  had  to  be willing  and  able 
to  perform  as  much  of  the  setup  operations  as  possible  for  the  next  product  batch  while 
machines  were  producing  the  current  product  batch.  The  reorganization  of work  needed  to 
reduce  setups  represented  another  productive  activity  that  could  take  advantage  of  the 
incentive  and  ability  of Japanese  shop-floor  workers  to  engage  in  a variety  of tasks.  The 
broader  knowledge  of  the  production  process  that  these  workers  possessed  was  in  turn 
used  to find  new ways  to reduce  setup  times. 
In the  United  States,  in contrast,  the  problem  of reducing  setup  times  was  neglected  in part 
because  of long  runs  and  in  part  because  of  the  unwillingness  of  American  management  to 
invest  in  shop-floor  skills.  In Japan  a dynamic  learning  process  was  set  in  motion  in which 
the  learning  of  shop-floor  workers  was  critical.  In  the  United  States,  hierarchical 
segmentation  meant  that,  when  the  production  of long  runs  of identical  output  was  no longer 
a viable  competitive  strategy,  corporations  had  not  developed  the  skill  bases  required  for 
reducing  setup  times. 
If  shop-floor  skills  can  prevent  downtime  through  quick  setups,  they  can  do  so  as  well 
through  machine  maintenance.  Keeping  machines  trouble  free  requires  the  involvement  of 
shop-floor  workers  in  continuous  inspection  and  daily  maintenance  as  well  as  engineers  to 
solve  chronic  problems  and to train  the  shop-floor  operatives.  As  Suzaki  has  put it, 
zero  machine  troubles  can  be achieved  more  effectively  by involving  operators  in 
maintaining  normal  machine  operating  conditions,  detecting  abnormal  machine 
conditions  as  early  as  possible,  and  developing  countermeasures  to  regain 
normal  machine  conditions.  This  requires  development  of  a  close  working 
36  Masaaki  Imai,  Kaizen:  The  Kev to Japan’s  Competitive  Success,  Random  House,  1986. 
37  Suzaki,  New  Manufacturinq  Challenqe,  43. 
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relationship  among  operators,  maintenance  crews,  and  other  support  people  as 
well  as  skill  development  and  training  to  increase  the  abilities  of  those  involved.38 
In  American  mass  production,  shop-floor  workers  have  not  only  lacked  the  skills  to  maintain 
machines.  They  have  also  been  denied  the  right  to  maintain  machines  by  managers  who 
feared  that,  far  from  reducing  downtime  by  keeping  machines  trouble  free,  such  shop-floor 
intervention  would  be  used  to  slow  the  pace  of  work.  Indeed  one  role  of  first-line 
supervisors  employed  on  American  mass-production  lines  has  typically  been  to  ensure  that 
production  workers  do  not  interfere  with  machine  operations  on  the  assumption  that  such 
intervention  will  make  the  machines  more  trouble  prone. 
Cellular  manufacturing,  quick  setups,  and  machine  maintenance  all  contribute  to  higher 
levels  of  machine  utilization  and  lower  unit  costs.  But  ultimately  unit  costs  are  dependent  on 
how  quickly  products  can  be  transformed  from  purchased  inputs  into  salable  outputs.  That 
is,  unit  costs  depend  on  cycle  time. 
As  Jeffrey  Funk  (on  the  basis  of  his  experience  working  at  Mitsubishi  Electric  Corporation  for 
a  year)  described  it:  “The  reductions  in  cycle  time  were  achieved  through  numerous 
engineer  and  operator  activities.”  The  engineers  were  primarily  responsible  for  making 
system-wide  improvements  concerned  with  identifying  and  resolving  production  bottlenecks, 
and  with  developing  “product  families”  of  different  types  of  chips  that  undergo  the  same 
processes,  thus  reducing  setup  times  and  eliminating  mistakes.  The  operators  were 
primarily  responsible  for  identifying  possibilities  for  localized  improvements  on  the  wafer  and 
assembly  lines.  Each  operator  was  in  a  working  group  that  met  once  or  twice  a  month, 
through  which  they  made  numerous  suggestions  for  improvements,  a  high  proportion  of 
which  were  acted  upon  by  engineers.  Operators  responsible  for  wafer  furnaces  contributed, 
for  example,  to  improvements  in  the  delivery,  queuing,  and  loading  systems,  all  of  which 
reduced  cycle  time.  At  Mitsubishi  Electric  between  1985  and  1989,  cycle  time  for 
semiconductor  chips  was  reduced  from  72  days  to  33  days,  even  as  the  number  of  chip 
styles  more  than  doubled  to  700  and  the  number  of  package  types  assembled  increased 
from  20  to  70.3g 
A  comparison  of  the  Mitsubishi  wafer  department  with  a U.S.  factory  using  similar  equipment 
found  that  the  Japanese  factory  produced  four  times  the  number  of wafers  per  direct  worker, 
employed  fewer  support  workers  per  direct  worker,  had  a  higher  ratio  of  output  to  input  in 
the  wafer  process,  and  had  a  cycle  time  that  was  one-fourth  of  that  achieved  by  the  U.S. 
factory.  “These  improvements,”  according  to  Funk, 
lead  to  shorter  cycle  time,  higher  yields,  less  wafer  breakage,  and  higher 
production  of  wafers  per  direct  worker.  The  multifunctional  workers  enable 
Mitsubishi  to  have  fewer  support  staff.  Since  the  direct  workers  perform  many  of 
the  activities  typically  performed  by  support  staff  in  a  U.S.  factory,  the  direct 
workers  can  determine  which  activities  are  most  important  and  how  to  improve 
the  efficiency  of  these  activities.40 
38  Suzaki,  New  Manufacturinq  Challenqe,  123 
3g  Jeffrey  L. Funk,  The  Teamwork  Advantaqe:  An  Inside  Look at Japanese  Product  and Technoloqy 
Elopment,  Productivity  Press,  1992,  197. 
IbId.,  198-204. 
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l  Utilization  of Materials 
Perhaps  the  most  famous  Japanese  management  practice  to  emerge  out  of  the  “high 
growth  era”  was  the  just-in-time  inventory  system,  (JIT).  By  delivering  components  to  be 
assembled  as  they  are  needed,  the  carrying  costs  and  storage  costs  of  work-in-progress 
can  be dramatically  reduced.  But  JIT  only  works  if the  parts  that  are  delivered  just  in time 
are  of consistently  high  quality.  JIT  only  yields  lower  unit  costs  when  component  suppliers, 
be they  in-house  or  external  subcontractors,  have  the  incentive  and  ability  to  deliver  such 
high-quality  parts.  It was  to ensure  the  timely  delivery  of such  high-quality  components,  for 
example,  that  in  1949  and  1950  the  first  step  taken  by  Taichi  Ohno  in  developing  JIT  at 
Toyota  was  to  reorganize  the  machine  shop  into  manufacturing  ceils  that  required  multi- 
skilled  operatives.4’ 
In  the  Japanese  assembly  process,  JIT  demands  high  levels  of  initiative  and  skill  from 
production  workers.  Using  the  kanban  system,  it is up to  assembly  workers  to send  empty 
containers  with  the  order  cards  -  or  kanban  -  to  the  upstream  component  supplier  to 
generate  a flow  of  parts.  The  assembly  worker,  therefore,  exercises  considerable  minute- 
to-minute  control  over  the  flow  of  work  -  a  delegation  of  authority  that  American  factory 
managers  deemed  to  be  out  of  the  question  in  the  post-World  War  II  decades  on  the 
assumption  that  shop-floor  workers  would  use such  control  to slow  the  speed  of the  line.  To 
prevent  a purported  shortage  of components  from  “creating”  a bottleneck  in the  production 
process,  American  managers  kept large  buffers  of in-process  inventory  along  the  line. 
The  Japanese  assembly  worker  also  has  the  right  to  stop  the  line  when,  because  of  part 
defects,  machine  breakdowns,  or human  incapacity,  the  flow  of work  cannot  be  maintained 
without  sacrificing  product  quality.  When  a problem  is  discovered  and  a worker  stops  the 
line,  a  light  goes  on  to  indicate  its  location  and  others  in  the  plant  join  the  worker  who 
stopped  the  line  in finding  a solution  to the  problem  as quickly  as possible.  To  participate  in 
this  process,  therefore,  shop-floor  workers  must  develop  the  skills  to  identify  problems  that 
warrant  a line  stoppage,  and they  must  contribute  to fixing  the  problem.  Without  hierarchical 
integration,  JIT  and kanban  cannot  work.42 
l  Product  quality 
The  willingness  of Japanese  companies  to develop  the  skills  of shop-floor  workers  led  to  a 
very  different  mode  of  implementing  quality  control  in  Japan  than  in  the  United  States. 
Statistical  quality  control  (SQC),  as  already  mentioned,  originated  in  the  United  States.  In 
American  manufacturing,  however,  SQC  remained  solely  a function  of  management,  with 
quality-control  specialists  inspecting  finished  products  after they  came  off the  line.  Defective 
products  had  to  be  scrapped  or  reworked,  often  at  considerable  expense.  Defects  that 
could  not  be  detected  because  they  were  built  into  the  product  would  ultimately  reveal 
themselves  to  customers  in  the  form  of  unreliable  performance,  again  at  considerable 
expense  to  the  manufacturing  company,  especially  when  higher  quality  competitors  came 
on the  market. 
For  American  companies,  from  the  1970s  the  higher  quality  competitors  were  typically  the 
Japanese.  In Japan,  the  integration  of shop-floor  workers  into the  process  of organizational 
41  Wada,  “The  ‘Flow  Production’  Method  in Japan,”  22. 
42  Kuniyoshi  Urabe,  “Innovation  and the Japanese  Management  System”  in Kuniyoshi  Urabe,  John 
Child,  and Tadao  Kagono,  eds.,  Innovation  and Manaqement:  International  Comparisons,  Walter  de 
Gruyter,  1988. 
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learning  meant  that  product  quality  could  be  monitored  while  work  was  in  progress  in  the 
production  process,  and  thus  that  defects  could  be  detected  and  corrected  before  they 
became  built  into  the  finished  product.  The  result  was  less  scrap,  less  rework,  and  more 
revenues  from  satisfied  customers. 
In  the  1950s  American  managers  could  justify  the  exclusion  of  shop-floor  workers  from 
participation  in  quality  control  on  the  grounds  that  the  SQC  methods  in  use  were  too 
complicated  for  the  blue-collar  worker.  Only  more  highly  educated  employees  were  deemed 
capable  of  applying  these  tools.  Given  the  quality  of  education  received  by  young 
Americans  destined  to  be  “semi-skilled”  factory  operatives,  the  managers  of  U.S.  companies 
had  a  point.  With  mass  education  being  controlled  and  funded  by  local  school  districts, 
most  future  blue-collar  workers  received  schooling  of  a  quality  that  was  consistent  with  the 
minimal  intellectual  requirements  of  repetitive  and  monotonous  factory  jobs.  This 
correspondence  between  schooling  and  prospective  skill  requirements  in  hierarchically 
segmented  workplaces  helps  to  explain  why  to  this  day  the  United  States  ranks  among  the 
lowest  of  the  advanced  economies  in  terms  of the  quality  of  mass  education  and  among  the 
highest  in  terms  of  the  quality  of  higher  education. 
In  Japan,  even  in  the  1950s  blue-collar  workers  with  manufacturing  companies  were  high- 
school  graduates.  But  as  part  of  a national  system  of  education  of  uniformly  high  standards, 
they  received  much  the  same  quality  education  as  those  who  would  go  on  to  university. 
Even  then,  the  involvement  of  Japanese  shop-floor  workers  in  SQC  was  accomplished  by 
making  the  methods  more  easily  accessible  and  usable  by  blue-collar  workers.  As  Kaoru 
Ishikawa,  the  pioneer  in  the  implementation  of  SQC  in  Japan,  put  it:  “We  overeducated 
people  by  giving  them  sophisticated  methods  where,  at  that  stage,  simple  methods  would 
have  sufficed.“4 
The  reliance  of  Japanese  companies  on  the  skill  and  initiative  of  shop-floor  workers  for 
superior  machine  utilization  and  reductions  in  materials  costs  made  these  employees  ideal 
monitors  of  product  quality.  Relying  on  this  skill  base,  SQC  became  integral  to  the 
Japanese  practice  of  building  quality  into  the  product  rather  than,  as  in  the  United  States, 
using  SQC  to  inspect  completed  products  that  had  defects  built  in. 
In  the  1960s  the  involvement  of  shop-floor  workers  in  improving  machine  utilization, 
materials  costs,  and  product  quality  became  institutionalized  in  quality  control  (QC)  circles. 
In  addition  to  initiatives  undertaken  by  individual  companies  to  apply  QC  methods  in 
particular  factories,  a  series  of  radio  broadcasts  by  JUSE  in  the  late  1950s  had  diffused  an 
awareness  of  the  potential  of  quality  control.  Then,  in  1960,  JUSE  put  out  a  publication,  A 
Text  on  Qualitv  Control  for  the  Foreman,  that  became  widely  used  by  first-line  supervisors  in 
the  workplace.44  The  success  of  this  publication  led  to  a  monthly  magazine,  Qualitv  Control 
for  the  Foreman  (FQC).  In  the  process  of  gathering  information  for  the  magazine,  JUSE 
found  that,  in  many  factories,  foremen  and  workers  had  formed  themselves  into  small 
groups  to  discuss  quality  control  and  its  application  to  specific  problems.  The  editorial  board 
of  FQC  (of  which  lshikawa  was  the  chairman),  in  issuing  the  following  statement,  effectively 
launched  the  QC  circle  movement: 
1.  Make  the  content  [of  FQC]  easy  for  everyone  to  understand.  Our 
task  is  to  educate,  train,  and  promote  QC  among  supervisors  and 
workers  in  the  forefront  of  our  work  force.  We  want  to  help  them 
enhance  their  ability  to  manage  and  to  improve. 
43 Ishikawa,  What  Is Total  Quality  Control?,  18 
44  Ibid..  21 
15 Lazonick:  Organizational  Learning  and  International  Competition 
2.  Set the  price  low to ensure  that  the journal  will  be within  the  reach  of 
everyone.  We  want  as  many  foremen  and  line  workers  as  possible  to 
read  it and  benefit  from  it. 
3.  At  shops  and  other  workplaces,  groups  are  to  be  organized  with 
foremen  as  their  leaders  and  include  other  workers  as  their  members. 
These  groups  are  to  be  named  QC  circles.  QC  circles  are  to  use  this 
journal  as  the  text  in  their  study  and  must  endeavor  to  solve  problems 
that  they  have  at their  place  of work.  QC circles  are to  become  the  core 
of quality  control  activities  in their  respective  shops  and workplaces.45 
QC  circles  could  be registered  with,  and  announced  in, FQC.  Beginning  in  1963  a national 
QC  circle  organization  was  created,  complete  with  central  headquarters,  nine  regional 
chapters,  conferences,  seminars,  and  overseas  study  teams.  Twenty  ears  later  there  were 
almost  175,000  QC circles  registered  with  nearly  1.5 million  members. Xi 
QC circles  became  extremely  effective  in generating  continuous  improvements  in the  quality 
and  cost  of  Japanese  manufactured  products.  In  participating  in  the  continuous 
improvement  of  these  production  systems,  shop-floor  workers  did  not  solve  problems  in 
isolation  from the  rest of the  organization  but rather  as part of a broader  and  deeper  process 
of  organizational  learning  that  integrated  the  work  of  engineers  and  operatives.  The 
foreman  as team  leader  served  as the  conduit  of information  up  and  down  the  hierarchical 
structure. 
The  QC  circle  movement,  led  by JUSE,  helped  to diffuse  throughout  Japanese  industry  the 
organizational  and technological  advances  made at the  leading  companies.  For example,  in 
the  mid-1960s  there  were  frequent  breakdowns  of a newly  installed  automatic  metal  plating 
machine  in  the  assembly  division  of  Toyota’s  Motomachi  Plant.  The  relevant  QC  circle 
systematically  considered  possible  causes,  and  through  testing  came  up with  solutions.  In 
reporting  the  work  of this  QC circle,  FQC  stated: 
The  supervisor  may  understand  the  design  of the  machine  and  how  to  run  it,  but 
is  probably  unaware  of  its  detailed  tendencies  or  weaknesses.  The  people  who 
know  best  about  the  condition  of the  machine  are the  workers,  and  quality  circles 
provide  an opportunity  to get important  information  from them.47 
In  solving  problems  in  machine  utilization,  QC  circles  found  that  the  solutions  invariably 
entailed  improvements  in product  quality  as well.  As  lzumi  Nonaka  has  put  it in his  account 
of the  history  of quality  control  at Toyota  and  Nissan: 
Toyota  production  methods,  such  as just-in-time,  kanban,  and jidoka  (automation) 
are well  known,  but  it should  be stressed  that,  in relation  to quality  control,  if 100 
per  cent  of  the  parts  reaching  a  given  process  are  not  defect  free,  Toyota 
methods  will  not  work  smoothly.  In  other  words,  quality  is  the  foundation  of 
Toyota  production  methods.  From  about  1963,  just-in-time  and  jidoka  were 
adopted  in  all  Toyota  factories,  and  a close  relationship  between  these  methods 
and  quality  was  immediately  established.48 
The  QC circle  movement  focused  Japanese  workers  on the  goal  of achieving  “zero  defects” 
45  Ibid., 138 
46  Ibid.,,  138-139,  See also  Nonaka,  “Development  of Company-Wide  Quality  Control.” 
47  Nonaka,  “Development  of Company-Wide  Quality  Control,”  154. 
48  Ibid.,  151 
16 Lazonick: Organizational Learning and International Competition 
-  detecting  and  eliminating  defects  as the  product  was  being  built  rather  than  permit  defects 
to  be  built  into  the  product.  In  recounting  why  an  incipient  zero  defect  (ZD)  movement 
(initiated  by the  U.S. Department  of Defense  for its contractors)  failed  in the  United  States  in 
the  mid-1960s  lshikawa  put  the  blame  squarely  on  the  failure  of American  companies  to 
integrate  shop-floor  workers  into  the  process,  as  was  being  done  in  Japan.  “The  ZD 
movement  became  a  mere  movement  of will,”  lshikawa  observed,  “a  movement  without 
tools.  .  .  .  It  decreed  that  good  products  would  follow  if operation  standards  were  closely 
followed.”  In  the  Japanese  quality  control  movement,  however,  it  was  recognized  that 
“operation  standards  are never  perfect.” 
What  operations  standards  lack,  experience  covers.  In  our  QC  circles  we  insist 
that  the  circle  examine  all  operation  standards,  observe  how  they  work,  and 
amend  them.  The  circle  follows  the  new  standards,  examines  them  again,  and 
repeats  the  process  of amendment,  observance,  etc.  As  this  process  is  repeated 
there  will  be an improvement  in technology  itself. 
Not  so,  however,  in  the  United  States,  where  management  practice  “has  been  strongly 
influenced  by the  so-called  Taylor  method.”  In the United  States,  according  to Ishikawa, 
engineers  create  work  standards  and  specifications.  Workers  merely  follow.  The 
trouble  with  this  approach  is that  the  workers  are  regarded  as  machines.  Their 
humanity  is ignored.  [Yet]  all responsibilities  for  mistakes  and  defects  were  borne 
by the workers.  . No wonder  the movement  went  astray.4g 
In  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s  on  the  eve  of  the  Japanese  challenge  to  U.S. 
manufacturing,  many  American  industrial  managers  began  to worry  not  so  much  about  the 
quality  of the  products  they  were  generating  as  about  the  quality  of shag-floor.work  itself. 
The  alienated  worker  was  fingered  as  the  source  of lagging  productivity.  Dunng  the  first 
half  of the  1960s  the  annual  average  rate  of increase  of  manufacturing  productivity  in  the 
United  States  had  been  5.1  percent  while  that  of  manufacturing  wages  had  been  3.9 
percent.  But  in  the  second  half  of  the  1960s  when  the  annual  rate  of  increase  of 
manufacturing  productivity  averaged  a  mere  0.6  percent,  manufacturing  wages  rose  at  a 
rate  of  5.9  percent.5’  Amidst  an  escalation  of  absenteeism  and  unauthorized  work 
stoppages,  the  productivity  problem  sparked  a  search  among  U.S.  manufacturing 
companies  for  new  structures  of  work  organization  that  would  secure  the  cooperation  of 
shop-floor  workers  in realigning  the  relation  between  work  and  pay. 
Within  the  automobile  industry,  the  United  Auto  Workers  joined  corporate  management  on a 
National  Joint  Committee  to  Improve  the  Quality  of Worklife.  The  problem  was  to  convince 
workers  that  programs  of “job enrichment”  and “job enlargement”  were  not merely  new ways 
to  speed  up  production  and  reduce  employment.  Unfortunately,  during  the  1970s  even 
many  promising  experiments  at  work  reorganization  that  had  already  yielded  significant 
productivity  gains  were  cut  short  when  middle  managers  and  first-line  supervisors  realized 
that  the  ultimate  success  of the  programs  entailed  a  loss  of  their  power  in  the  traditional 
hierarchically  segmented  organization5’  Indeed,  in  general,  the  more  pervasive  response 
49 Ishikawa,  New  Manufacturinq  Challense,  151-152 
5o  See U.S.  Department  of Health,  Education,  and Welfare,  Work  in America,  MIT  Press,  1972; 
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to  the  productivity  problem  in  American  manufacturing  in  the  1970s  was  an  increase  in 
shop-floor  supervision  rather  than  the  transformation  of  work  organization.  From  1950  to 
1970,  the  number  of  foremen  per  100  workers  in  American  manufacturing  increased  from 
3.4  to  4.8;  by  1980  this  ratio  had  shot  up  to  8.0.53 
During  the  1980s  in  the  face  of  intense  and  growing  competition  from  the  Japanese,  many 
companies  throughout  the  United  States  sought  to  introduce  Japanese-style  “quality 
programs”  into  their  workplaces.  In  their  comprehensive  survey  of  available  case  studies  of 
these  “experiments  in  workplace  innovation,”  Eileen  Appelbaum  and  Rose  Batt  found  that 
“U.S.  companies  have  largely  implemented  innovations  on  a  piecemeal  basis  and  that  most 
experiments  do  not  add  up  to  a  coherent  alternative  to  [traditional  U.S.]  mass  production.“54 
They  contended  that 
quality  circles  and  other  parallel  structures  [of  work  reorganization]  were  a  ‘fad’  in 
the  early  1980s  and  have  since  been  discredited  in  most  U.S.  applications  as 
either  not  sustainable  or  providing  limited  results.  .  .  The  overwhelming  majority 
of  cases  show  that  firms  have  introduced  modest  changes  in  work  organization, 
human  resource  practices,  or  industrial  relations  -  parallel  structures  such  as 
quality  circles  involving  only  a  few  employees,  a  training  program,  or  a  new 
compensation  system.  We  consider  these  to  be  marginal  changes  because  they 
do  not  change  the  work  system  or  power  structure  in  a fundamental  way.55 
The  fundamental  problem,  I would  argue,  was  lack  of  resolve  by  those  who  governed  these 
corporations  to  effect  the  organizational  integration  of  “hourly”  shop-floor  workers  and 
“salaried”  managerial  employees.  What  is  more,  it appears  that  hierarchical  segmentation  in 
U.S.  industrial  enterprises  fostered  functional  segmentation.  Distant  from  the  realities  of 
problem-solving  in  the  actual  production  process,  U.S.  technical  specialists  sought  to  solve 
problems  by  using  the  tools  of  their  own  particular  disciplines,  putting  up  barriers  to 
communicating  even  with  other  specialists  within  the  managerial  organization,  and  throwing 
partially  solved  problems  “over  the  wall”  into  the  domains  of  other  functional  specialists.56  In 
Japan,  by  contrast,  the  hierarchical  integration  of  technical  specialists  in  a  learning  process 
Review  of Radical  Political  Economics,  7, Summer  1975; Stephen  A. Marglin,  “Catching  Flies With 
Honey:  An  Inquiry  into  Management  Initiatives  to Humanize  Work,”  Economic  Analvsis  and Workers’ 
ganaqement,  13, 1979. 
Nelson  Lrchtenstein,  “‘The  Man  in the Middle’:  A Social  History  of Automobile  Industry  Foremen,” 
in Nelson  Lichtenstein  and  Stephen  Meyer,  eds. On the  Line:  Essavs  in the  Historv  of Auto  Work, 
University  of Illinois  Press,  1989. 
54  Eileen  Appelbaum  and  Rosemary  Batt, The  New American  Workplace:  Transforminq  Work 
Systems  in the  United  States,  Cornell  University  Press,  1994,  IO. 
55  Ibid.,  70.  See also Thomas  Kochan,  Harry  Katz, and  Nancy  Mower,  Worker  Participation  and 
American  Unions:  Threat  or Opportunitv?,  W. E. Upjohn  Institute  for Employment  Research,  1984; 
Edward  E. Lawler  III, Gerald  Ledford,  and Susan  A Mohrman,  Employee  Involvement  in America:  A 
Studv  of Contemporary  Practice,  American  Quality  and  Productivity  Center,  1989; Robert  E. Cole, 
Strateqies  for  Learnina:  Small  Group  Activities  in American,  Japanese,  and Swedish  Industry, 
University  of California  Press,  1989. 
56  The  problem  of functional  segmentation  in U.S.-Japanese  competition  has in recent  years  become 
a prime  focus  of comparative  studies  carried  out in American  business  schools.  See for example 
Kim B. Clark  and  Takahiro  Fujimoto,  Product  Development  Performance,  Harvard  Business  School 
Press,  1991;  Funk,  Teamwork  Advantage;  D. Eleanor  Westney,  “The  Evolution  of Japan’s  Industrial 
Research  and  Development,”  in Masahiko  Aoki  and  Ronald  Dore. eds.,  The  Japanese  Firm: The 
Sources  of Competitive  Strenqth,  Oxford  University  Press,  1994; Daniel  I. Okimoto  and Yoshio  Nishi, 
“R&D  Organization  in Japanese  and American  Semiconductor  Firms.”  in Aoki  and  Dore, The 
Japanese  Firm. 
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with  production  workers  created  lines  of communication  and  incentives  to  solve  problems  in 
concert  with  other  specialists.  Relative  to their  competitors  in the  United  States,  the  result  of 
functional  integration  for Japanese  manufacturers  has  been  not only  superior  product  quality 
but also  more  rapid  new  product  development. 
The  different  way  in which  quality  control  was  implemented  in Japan  and  the  United  States 
is  a case  in  point.  In  Japan,  QC  was  embedded  in the  whole  structure  of  organizational 
learning.  In Japan  quality  control  is, as lzumi  has  put  it, “the  responsibility  of all employees, 
including  top  and  middle  management  as  well  as  lower-level  workers,  from  planning  and 
design,  to  production,  marketing,  and  sales.  .  . 
specialist  quality  control  inspectors.“57 
[in]  contrast  with  the  American  reliance  on 
lshikawa  has  emphasized  the  functional 
segmentation  of American  QC inspectors: 
In  the  United  States  and  Western  Europe,  great  emphasis  is  placed  on 
professionalism  and  specialization.  Matters  relating  to  QC therefore  become  the 
exclusive  preserve  of QC specialists.  When  questions  are  raised  concerning  QC, 
people  belonging  to  other  divisions  will  not  answer,  they  will  simply  refer  the 
questions  to those  who  handle  QC. 
In Western  countries,  when  a QC specialist  enters  a company,  he  is immediately 
put  in the  QC  division.  Eventually  he  becomes  head  of a subsection,  a section, 
then  of the  QC division.  This  system  is effective  in nurturing  a specialist,  but from 
the  point  of view  of the  entire  business  organization,  is  more  likely  to  produce  a 
person  of very  limited  vision. 
For  better  or  for  worse,  in  Japan  little  emphasis  is  placed  on  professionalism. 
When  an  engineer  enters  a  company,  he  is  rotated  among  different  divisions, 
such  as  design,  manufacturing,  and  QC.  At  times,  some  engineers  are  even 
placed  in the  marketing  division.  58 
l  Factory  Automation 
In  the  late  1970s  American  manufacturers  continued  to  attribute  the  mounting  Japanese 
challenge  to  low  wages  and  the  persistent  productivity  problem  at  home  to  worker 
alienation.  By  the  1980s  and  1990s  however,  the  innovative  reality  of  the  Japanese 
challenge  became  difficult  to ignore,  as the Japanese  increased  their  shares  of U.S. markets 
across  a  range  of  key  industries,  even  as  Japanese  wage  rates  rapidly  rose  and  the  yen 
steadily  strengthened. 
Even  then,  there  appeared  to  be  a  way  out  for  U.S.  manufacturers  that  did  not  require 
imitation  of  the  Japanese  by  building  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases.  Since  the  1950s 
American  management  had  envisioned  “the  Factory  of  the  Future”  --  a  completely 
automated  production  facility  that  would  do  away  with  the  need  to  employ  production 
workers  altogether.5g  Yet,  notwithstanding  massive  investments  by  U.S.  corporations  and 
the  U.S.  government  in factory  automation,  attempts  by American  companies  to  create  the 
57  Nonaka,  “Development  of Company-Wide  Quality  Control.” 
5B  Ishikawa,  New  Manufacturing  Challenqe,  23. 
”  See  David  F. Noble,  Forces  of Production:  A Social  Historv  of Industrial  Automation,  Oxford 
University  Press,  1984, ch. 4. 
19 Lazonick:  Organizational  Learning  and  International  Competition 
“factory  of the  future”  failed.60 
In sharp  contrast,  building  on their  investments  in broad  and  deep  skill  bases,  and  decades 
of continuous  improvement  of  production  processes,  Japanese  companies  succeeded.  At 
the  end  of  1992,  the  Japanese  had  installed  about  349,500  robots  compared  to  47,000  in 
the  United  States  and  39,400  in  Germany.”  The  Japanese  also  developed  and  utilized 
flexible  manufacturing  systems  (FMS)  --  computer-controlled  configurations  of  semi- 
independent  work  stations  connected  by automated  material  handling  systems  -- in advance 
of,  and  on  a scale  that  surpassed,  other  nations.62  Japan’s  success  in  machine  tools  and 
factory  automation  reflected  their  leadership  in the  integration  of mechanical  and  electronics 
technologies,  or what  since  the  mid-l  970s the Japanese  have  called  “mechatronics”.63 
For  example,  in  his  case  study  of the  introduction  of  FMS  at  Hitachi  Seiki,  Ramchandran 
Jaikumar  found  that  the  first  two  attempts,  undertaken  between  1972  and  1980,  had  failed 
because  of  insufficient  coordination  across  functions.  In  1980,  therefore,  the  company  set 
up  the  Engineering  Administration  Department  that  “brought  together  a variety  of different 
functions  from  machine  design,  software  engineering,  and tool  design.“64  The  new  structure 
of organizational  learning,  which  built  on the lessons  of the  previous  failures,  led to success. 
The  development  teams  on the two failed  attempts  had,  according  to Jaikumar, 
integrated  the  different  components  of  their  systems  through  machinery  design 
rather  than  through  general  systems  engineering  concepts.  They  had  viewed 
flexible  manufacturing  systems  as technical  problems  to  be solved  with  technical 
expertise.  The  difficulty  of  evaluating  trade-offs  whenever  conflicts  arose  over 
design  specifications  or  procedures  convinced  Hitachi  Seiki  that  it was  problems 
of  coordination  among  people  that  was  stymying  systems  development.  The 
company  realized  that  what  was  needed  was  to  view  FMS  as  a  manufacturing 
problem  to  be  solved  with  both  manufacturing  and  technical  expertise. 
Consequently  the  third  phase  of FMS  development  at Hitachi  Seiki  was  a radical 
departure  from the  previous  two.65 
In his comparisons  of  Japanese  and  U.S. FMS in the first  half of the  1980s  Jaikumar  found 
that,  even  though  the  FMS  installations  in both  countries  contained  similar  machines  doing 
similar  kinds  of work,  the  Japanese  developed  the  systems  in  half the  time,  produced  over 
nine  times  as  many  parts  per  system  in  average  annual  volumes  that  were  about  one- 
seventh  of  American  practice,  with  much  greater  automation,  and  utilization  rates.66 
“Differences  in results,”  said  Jaikumar,  “derive  mainly  from the  extent  of the  installed  base  of 
machinery,  the  technical  literacy  of the work  force,  and the  competence  of management.  In 
each  of these  areas,  Japan  is far ahead  of the  United  States.“67 
w For an excellent  case  study,  see  Noble,  Forces  of Production;  see also  Robert  J. Thomas,  What 
Machines  Can’t  Do: Politics  and Technoloov  in the Industrial  Enterprise,  University  of California 
Press,  1994. 
”  Tsuneta  Yano  Memorial  Society,  ed.,  Nippon:  A Charted  Survev  of Japan,  1993/94,  Kokusei-sha, 
1993,  191. 
62  Ramchandran  Jaikumar.  “Japanese  Flexible  Manufacturing  Systems:  Impact  on the  United 
States,”  Japan  and the World  Economy,  1 1989. 
63  See Fumio  Kodama,  Emeraina  Patterns  of Innovation:  Sources  of Japan’s  Technolooical  Edae, 
Harvard  Business  School  Press,  1995,193;  also V. Daniel  Hunt,  Mechatronics:  Japan’s  Newest 
Threat,  Chapman  and  Hall,  1988. 
64umar,  “Japanese  Flexible  Manufacturing  Systems,”  126. 
65  Ibid. 
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More  specifically,  he  described  how  the  Japanese  developed  the  reliability  of  FMS  to 
achieve  untended  (automated)  operations  and  system  uptime  levels  of over  90  percent,  in 
the  process  transforming  not  only  shop-floor  technology  but  also  the  job  of  a  “shop-floor 
operator”. 
The  entire  project  team  remains  with  the  system  long  after  installation,  continually 
making  changes.  Learning  occurs  throughout  and  is  translated  into  on-going 
process  mastery  and  productivity  enhancement.  .  .  Operators  on the  shop  floor, 
highly  skilled  engineers  with  multifunctional  responsibilities,  make  continual 
programming  changes  and  are  responsible  for  writing  new  programs  for  both 
parts  and  systems  as  a whole.  Like  designers,  they  work  best  in  small  teams. 
Most  important,  Japanese  managers  see  FMS technology  for what  it is -- flexible 
__ and  create  operating  objectives  and  protocols  that  capitalize  on  this  special 
capability.  Not  bound  by  outdated  mass-production  assumptions,  they  view  the 
challenge  of flexible  manufacturing  as automating  a job  sho  not simply  making  a 
transfer  line flexible.  The  difference  in results  is enormous. fZ3’ 
Ultimately,  then,  the  development  of  automated  systems  --  including  the  integration  of 
electronic,  mechanical,  and  chemical  processes  that  made these  technologies  “advanced”  -- 
has  not  been  the  work  of “blue-collar”  employees,  even  as the  Japanese  have  traditionally 
understood  the  term.  Rather  it  has  been  the  work  of teams  of  highly  educated  and  highly 
trained  engineers  who  had  mastered  their  technical  specialties  but who  were  also  able  and 
willing  to  integrate  across  specialties.  As  stated  earlier,  that  the  Japanese  could  even 
consider  entry  into  complex  manufacturing  industries  such  as  automobiles  and  consumer 
electronics  after World  War  II was  because  of the  learning  that  their  scientists  and engineers 
had accumulated  in the  decades  before  as well  as during  the war. 
But the  Japanese  history  of the  hierarchical  integration  of traditional  blue-collar  workers  into 
the  development  and  utilization  of  manufacturing  technology  laid  the  basis  for  functional 
integration  as  technology  became  more  and  more  complex.  The  accumulated  learning  of 
Japan’s  scientists  and  engineers  after  the  war  was  in  and  of itself  no  match  for  that  which 
the  American’s  possessed.  Yet,  during  the  postwar  decades  Japanese  scientists  and 
engineers  developed  and  utilized  their  collective  capabilities  in manufacturing  as  part  of an 
organizational  learning  process  that  integrated  the  capabilities  of  shop-floor  workers  in 
making  continuous  improvements  to  the  manufacturing  process.  In  the  1980s  and  1990s 
this  history  of  hierarchical  integration  played  a  significant  role  in  fostering  the  functional 
integration  that  has  been  key  to  Japan’s  success  relative  to  the  United  States  in  factory 
automation. 
The  importance  of  taking  organizational  learning  to  the  shop  floor  also  applies  in  the 
semiconductor  industry,  the  most  complex  and  automated  of manufacturing  processes.  As 
Okimoto  and  Nishi  argue  in  their  excellent  comparative  study  of  Japanese  and  U.S. 
semiconductor  manufacturing: 
Perhaps  the  most  striking  feature  of Japanese  R&D in the  semiconductor  industry 
is the  extraordinary  degree  of communication  and  ‘body  contact’  that  takes  place 
at the  various  juncture  and  intersection  points  in the  R&D processes  -  from  basic 
research  to  advanced  development,  from  advanced  development  to  new  product 
design,  from  new  product  design  to  new  process  technology,  from  new  process 
68  ibid., 130. 
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technology  to  factory-site  manufacturing,  from  manufacturing  to  marketing,  and 
from  marketing  to  servicing.  Owing  to  pragmatic  organizational  innovations, 
Japanese  semiconductor  manufacturers  have  excelled  -  where  many  American 
and  European  manufacturers  have  faltered  -  at  the  seemingly  simple  but 
extremely  difficult  task  of  making  smooth  ‘hand-offs’  at  each  juncture  along  the 
long-interconnected  R&D pipeline.6g 
The  key links  in this  pipeline  in Japanese  semiconductor  R&D are between  divisional  labs 
and factory  engineering  labs.  Engineers  from these  labs, according  to Okimoto  and  Nishi, 
“continually  meet  and  interact  in seeking  to iron out problems  that  inevitably  arise  in mass- 
manufacturing  new  products.“”  Okimoto  and Nishi  continue,  stressing  the  importance  of 
the  integration  of R&D with  manufacturing: 
The  largest  concentration  [of  engineers]  is  usually  found  at  the  FELs  [factory 
engineering  laboratories],  located  at factory  sites  where  the  messy  problems  of 
mass  production  have  to  be  worked  out.  The  majority  of  Japanese  engineers 
have  at  least  some  exposure  to  manufacturing  engineering  as  part  of  their  job 
rotation  and  career  training.  Not  only  is  there  no  stigma  attached  to 
manufacturing  assignments;  the  ladder  of promotion  leading  up to  higher  reaches 
of  executive  management  -  and  beyond  (including  amakudari,  or  post-career 
executive  entry  into  new  companies)  -  pass  through  jobs  that  involve  hands-on 
manufacturing  experience.  it is almost  a requirement  for upward  career  and  post- 
career  mobility. 
In  the  United  States,  by  contrast,  manufacturing  engineers  carry  the  stigma  of 
being  second-class  citizens.  To  the  manufacturing  engineers  falls  the  ‘grubby’ 
work  of  production  -  for  which  they  receive  lower  pay  and  lower  prestige 
compared  with  the  ‘glamorous’  design  jobs.  In  how  many  US  semiconductor 
companies  can  it  be  said  that  the  majority  of  engineers  are  engaged  in 
manufacturing?  Few,  if  any.  And,  looking  at  the  large  number  of  merchant 
semiconductor  houses  in Silicon  Valley,  we see that  only  a minority  even  possess 
manufacturing  facilities,  much  less factory  engineering  laboratories.” 
It  would  appear  more  generally  that,  by  focusing  the  skills  and  efforts  of  engineers  on 
continuous  improvements  in  quality  and  cost  in  the  production  process,  hierarchical 
integration  provided  a foundation  for functional  integration  in Japanese  manufacturing.  If, in 
the  first  half  of the  1980%  most  Western  analyses  of the  sources  of Japanese  competitive 
advantage  focused  on  the  integration  of  the  shop-floor  worker  into  the  organizational 
learning  process,  over  the  last  decade  or so the  emphasis  has  shifted  to the  role  of “cross- 
functional  management”,  “company-wide  quality  control,”  or  “concurrent  engineering”  in 
generating  higher  quality,  lower  cost  products.  Much  of  the  discussion  of  functional 
integration  has  been  focused  on  its  role  in  “new  product  development”  in  international 
comparative  perspective.72  But,  I would  argue,  the  key  to  understanding  the  influence  of 
functional  integration  on  innovation  and  international  competitive  advantage  is  the 
integration  of  product  and  process  development,  and  the  skill-base  strategy  that  such 
6g  Daniel  I. Okimoto  and Yoshio  Nishi,  “R&D  Organization  in Japanese  and American  Semiconductor 
Firms,”  193. 
”  Ibid.,  195. 
”  Ibid. 
”  See for example  Clark  and  Fujimoto,  Product  Development  Performance.  See also  lkujiro  Nonaka 
and  Hirotaka  Takeuchi,  The  Knowledae-Creating  Company,  Oxford  University  Press,  1995. 
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integration  entails.  Such  an understanding  of organizational  integration  requires  an analysis 
of functional  integration  in relation  to the  legacy  of hierarchical  integration  or segmentation. 
A Research  Aaenda 
if valid,  the  skill-base  hypothesis  can  reconcile  the  fact that  many  U.S. industrial  enterprises 
still  remain  innovators  in  international  competition  with  the  evidence  on  increasing  income 
inequality  in the  United  States.  A systematic  bias  of U.S. industrial  corporations  to compete 
for  product  markets  by  investing  in  narrow  and  concentrated  skill  bases  could  provide  a 
significant  explanation  for  the  income  inequality  trends  over  the  last  two  decades  or  so. 
Testing  the  skill-base  hypothesis  may  help  provide  answers  to  a  number  of  related 
questions  concerning  the ways  in which,  in particular  industries  and  activities,  U.S. industrial 
corporations  have  responded  to international  competitive  challenges. 
To  what  extent  have  U.S.  companies  exited  from  particular  industries,  and  particular 
activities  within  a particular  industry,  in which  they  have  been  challenged  by enterprises 
that  have  invested  in  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases  as  an  alternative  to  transforming 
their  strategies  and  structures  to  make  the  requisite  investments  in  organizational 
learning? 
To  what  extent  have  the  attempts  of  U.S.  companies  to  respond  to  these  competitive 
challenges  been  hampered  by  their  failure  to  confront  and  transform  sufficiently  the 
strategic,  functional,  and  hierarchical  segmentation  that  they  have  inherited  from  the 
past? 
What  can  we  learn  about  the  incentive  and  ability  of  U.S.  companies  to  make 
investments  in broader  and  deeper  skill  bases  by comparing  strategy,  organization,  and 
performance  of different  companies  in the  same  industry  -- for  example,  Ford,  GM,  and 
Chrysler  in  automobiles  --  that  have  sought  to  respond  to  the  same  international 
competitive  challenges? 
What  has  been  the  importance  of  foreign  direct  investment  --  for  example,  Japanese 
“transplants”  in  the  United  States  --  as  distinct  from  international  trade  in  shaping  the 
responses  of U.S. companies  to international  competitive  challenges? 
What  has  been  distinctive  about  the  investment  strategies  and  organizational  structures 
of U.S.  companies  that  have  become  or remained  leaders  in international  competition  in 
the  1980s  and  199Os?  Did  an  historical  legacy  of  investments  in  broader  and  deeper 
skill  bases,  and  a  relative  absence  of  organizational  segmentation,  enable  an  older 
company  like  Motorola  or  3M  to  continue  to  make  such  investments  in  the  1980s  and 
1990s  thus  representing  the  exceptions  that  prove  the  rule  in  U.S.  industry?  Have 
newer  companies  such  as  Intel  and  Microsoft  become  world  leaders  through  the 
organizational  integration  of narrow  and concentrated  skill  bases? 
Such  questions  indicate  that  testing  the  skill-base  hypothesis  and  its immediate  implications 
requires  in-depth  research  of  particular  companies  that  compete  in  particular  industries  in 
different  national  economies  in different,  and typically  over  prolonged,  periods  of time.  The 
more  limited  objective  of  this  paper  has  been  to  elaborate  the  analytical  framework  for 
testing  the  skill-base  hypothesis  by  synthesizing  available  evidence  on  differences  in 
organizational  learning  in industries  in which  the  United  States  and  Japan  compete  head-to- 
head. 
23 Lazonick:  Organizational  Learning  and  International  Competition 
What  are  those  industries,  and  how  has  competitive  advantage  been  shifting  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan?  Tables  2a-c  show  the  structure  of bilateral  Japanese-U.S.  trade 
from  1979 to  1995. 
Table  2a.  Japan-U.S.  Bilateral  Merchandise  Trade,  1979,1987,  and  1995 
millions  of U.S. dollars  (current) 
1979  1987  1995 
TOTAL 
Foodstuffs 
Raw  Materials 
Light  Goods 
Chemical  Goods 
Metal  Goods 
Machinery 
Office  Machines 
Electrical  Machinery 
Transportation  Equip. 
Precision  Instruments 
Reexports,unclassified 
Exports  Imports  Exports 
26,403.5  20,430.8  83579.9 
189.0  4,422.g  404.1 
136.5  6,011.7  167.3 
2,200.6  481.1  6,465.5 
653.1  2,053.3  2,080.8 
3,939.6  1,660.7  4,101.8 
19,008.3  4,310.2  69,493.g 
679.9  530.1  7,373.7.1 
4,393.3  1,349.g  17,050.l 
10,106.4  985.5  32,050.3 
1515.9  357.9  3,967.3 
275.4  133.5  866.5 
Table  2b.  Japan-U.S.  Trade  Growth,  1979-I  995 
1979=100 
Japanese  Exports  to US 
1979  1987  1995 
TOTAL  100  317  458 
Foodstuffs  100  214  161 
Raw  Materials  100  123  279 
Light  Goods  100  294  363 
Chemical  Goods  100  319  739 
Metal  Goods  100  104  103 
Machinery  100  366  527 
Office Machines  100  1085  2086 
Electrical  Machinery  100  388  669 
Transportation  Equip.  100  317  317 
Precision  Instruments  100  262  432 
Reexports,  unclassified  100  315  1141 
Imports  Exports  Imports 
31,490.5  120,858.g  75,408.l 
6,778.g  303.4  15,951.4 
5,645.2  380.9  8,017.2 
3,037.6  7,979.4  8,745.8 
4,035.3  4,826.1  7,072.7 
901 .o  4,045.l  2,190.4 
9,075.4  100,182.5  30,515.6 
1,589.g  14,183.7  4,862.5 
3,008.g  29,384.8  12,746.4 
1,854.7  32,023.g  5,987.7 
620.1  6,545.7  1,844.5 
622.5  3,141.0  1,603.O 
US Exports  to Japan 
1979  1987  19$5 
100  154  369 
100  153  361 
100  94  133 
100  631  1818 
100  197  344 
100  54  132 
100  211  708 
100  300  917 
100  223  944 
100  188  608 
100  173  515 
100  466  1201 
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Table  2c.  Proportionate  Shares  of Japan-US  Bilateral  Merchandise  Trade, 
1979,1987,  and  1995 
Percent  of Annual  Bilateral  Exports 
Japanese  Exports  US Exports 




Light  Goods 
Chemical  Goods 
Metal  Goods 
Machinery 
Office Machines 
Electrical  Machinery 
Transportation  Equip. 
Precision  Instruments 
Reexports,  unclassified 
1979  1987  1995  1979  1987  1995 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
0.7  0.5  0.3  21.6  21.5  21.2 
0.5  0.2  0.3  29.4  17.9  10.6 
8.3  7.7  5.2  2.4  9.6  11.6 
2.5  2.5  4.0  10.1  12.8  9.4 
14.9  4.9  3.3  8.1  2.9  2.9 
72.0  83.1  82.9  21.1  28.8  40.5 
2.6  0.0  11.7  2.6  5.0  6.5 
16.6  20.4  24.3  6.6  9.6  16.9 
38.3  38.3  26.5  4.8  5.9  7.9 
5.7  5.2  5.4  1.8  2.0  2.4 
1.0  1.0  2.6  0.7  2.0  2.1 
Source:  Japan  External  Trade  Oragnization,  White  Papers  on  International  Trade,  Japan, 
Trade  Statistics,  Ministry  of International  Trade  and  Industry,  1980,  1988,  1996. 
As  useful  as  these  data  are  as  points  of  departure,  they  have  important  limitations  for 
defining  the  comparative  case  studies  needed  to  test  the  skill-base  hypothesis.  The 
importance  of foreign  direct  investment,  cross-border  outsourcing,  and third-country  exports 
means  that  trade  data  provide  only  a  partial  picture  of  shifts  in  head-to-head  competitive 
advantage.  Moreover,  as  we  shall  see  for  example  in  the  case  of  “aircraft  engines  and 
parts”,  hidden  within  a  narrowly  defined  industrial  classification  of  traded  goods,  may  be 
important  international  divisions  of  labor  that  reflect  investments  in  different  types  of  skill 
bases. 
In  1995  Japan  exported  $120.9  billion  of goods  to  the  United  States  (27.  3  percent  of  all 
Japanese  exports)  and  imported  $75.4  billion  from  the  United  States  (22.4  percent  of  all 
Japanese  imports)  for  a merchandise  trade  surplus  of $45.5  billion.73  The  United  States  is 
by  far  Japan’s  foremost  trade  partner  for  both  exports  and  imports.  Japan’s  next  largest 
trade  partners  in  1995  were  for  exports  South  Korea  (7.1  percent  of Japan’s  total)  and  for 
imports  China  (10.7  percent  of the total).74 
Of Japan’s  exports  to the  United  States  in  1995,  82.9  percent  fell  under  the  broad  category 
of  “machinery”.  This  category  included,  among  the  major  classifications,  office  machines 
(11.7  percent  of  all  goods  exports),  electrical  machinery  (24.3  percent),  transportation 
equipment  (26.5  percent,  of which  automobiles  were  18.3 percent  and  automobile  parts  6.5 
percent),  and  precision  instruments  (5.4  percent)  (see  Table  2~).  The  remainder  of 
Japanese  exports  to  the  United  States  consisted  largely  of  chemical  goods  (4.0  percent), 
metal  goods  (3.3  percent),  and  light  industrial  products  (6.6 percent). 
73  Nikkei Weekly,  ed., Japan  Economic  Almanac  1997, Nihon  Keizai  Shimbun,  1997,  107. 
74  Ibid. 
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What  did  the  United  States  export  to Japan?  Machinery  accounted  for 40.5  percent  of U.S. 
exports,  consisting  mainly  office  machines  (6.5  percent),  electrical  machinery  (16.9  percent, 
of  which  semiconductors  and  integrated  circuits  were  7.1  percent),  and  transportation 
equipment  (7.9  percent).  The  remainder  of U.S. manufactured  exports  to the  United  States 
consisted  mainly  of  an  assortment  of light  products  (11.6  percent,  including  textiles,  paper 
products,  records  and  tapes,  and  sporting  goods)  and chemical  goods  (9.4  percent).  But all 
manufactured  goods  only  accounted  for less than  two-thirds  of U.S. exports  to Japan.  Over 
one-third  of  U.S.  exports  to  Japan  in  1995  were  either  foodstuffs  (21.2  percent)  or  raw 
materials  (10.6  percent).  For  Japan,  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials  exports  were  only  0.6 
percent  of its total  exports  to the  United  States. 
Note  that,  in the  197Os, as  the  Japanese  challenge  mounted,  the  United  States  was  even 
more  reliant  than  it would  be in  1995,  in relative  terms  at least,  on exports  of foodstuffs  and 
raw  materials  to  Japan.  In  1979,  51.0  percent  of  U.S.  exports  to  Japan  took  the  form  of 
these  basic  materials.  In  that  year  75  percent  of  Japan’s  raw  materials  imports  from  the 
United  States  were  soybeans  (5.7  percent  of total  imports),  wood  (11.2  percent),  and  coal 
(5.0  percent).  By  1995  Japan  imported  a  somewhat  larger  quantity  of  soybeans  (but  the 
proportion  of total  imports  fell to  1.5 percent),  and  absolutely  smaller  quantities  of wood  (4.2 
percent)  and  coal  (0.9  percent).  Hence  over  the  l&year  period,  the  relative  importance  of 
foodstuffs  for  U.S.  exports  to  Japan  was  maintained,  while  the  relative,  and  in some  cases 
absolute,  importance  of raw materials  declined. 
The  case  of  U.S.  agriculture  is  a  case  in  point  of  the  need  for  in-depth  industry-specific 
analyses  of the  sources  of sustainable  competitive  advantage.  Looking  at the trade  data,  an 
economist  might  conclude  that  the  importance  of raw  materials,  and  particularly  foodstuffs, 
in  U.S.  exports  to  Japan  is  simply  a  matter  of  very  different  land-labor  ratios  in  the  two 
nation’s  factor  endowments.  To  draw  such  a conclusion,  as valid  as  it might  appear  on the 
surface,  would,  however,  miss  the  critical  importance  of collective  and  cumulative  learning 
on  a national  scale  over  the  past  century  in  making  agriculture  the  one  industrial  sector  in 
which  the  international  competitive  advantage  of the  United  States  is  most  sustainable.  It 
would  neglect  a  century-long  history  of  organizational  learning,  akin  to  the  managerial 
revolution  that  occurred  within  major  U.S.  industrial  corporations,  in  which  the  U.S. 
Department  of  Agriculture  created  a  national  system  of  research  and  development  that 
diffused  new  technology  to  millions  of  farmers  through  the  state-based  activities  of  land- 
grant  colleges,  experiment  stations,  and  county  agents.  Indeed,  the  legacy  of this  massive 
investment  in organizational  learning  is not only  productive  supremacy  in agriculture  but also 
the  world’s  foremost  structure  of  industrial  research  institutions  embedded  in  the  U.S. 
system  of higher  education.75 
Note  also  that  the  relative  importance  of  machinery  exports  from  Japan  increased 
substantially  in  the  first  eight-year  period,  while  the  relative  importance  of  U.S.  machinery 
exports  increased  from  1979 to 1995, with  the major gains  being  made  in the  late  1980s  and 
early  1990s.  The  United  States  made  these  gains  despite  the  continuing  decline  of  its 
machine  tool  industry  in  the  face  of  relentless  Japanese  competition.  By  1991,  compared 
with  the  U.S. machine  tool  industry,  the value  of Japanese  machine  tool  production  was  356 
percent  and  machine  tool  exports  443  percent.76  In  the  1990s  the  Japanese  have  also 
75  Louis  Ferleger  and William  Lazonick,  “The  Managerial  Revolution  and the  Developmental  State:  The 
Case  of U.S. Agriculture,”  Business  and  Economic  History,  2nd ser., 22, 2, 1993;  Louis  Ferleger 
and William  Lazonick,  “Higher  Education  for an Innovative  Economy:  Land-Grant  Colleges  and the 
Managerial  Revolution  in America,”  Business  and Economic  History,  2nd ser., 23,  1, 1994. 
76  Yano  Memorial  Society,  Nippon,  199. 
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successfully  challenged  the  German  machine  tool  manufacturers,  surpassing  them  for  the 
first  time  in  1992  in  the  value  of  production,  and  in  1993  in  the  value  of  exports.  Capturing 
larger  and  larger  shares  of  export  markets  through  1996,  Japanese  companies  now 
completely  dominate  the  mid-range  and  high-range  markets  for  CNC  (computer  numerically 
controlled)  machine  tools.  The  low-end  markets  have  been  left  mainly  to  Taiwanese 
companies,  and  the  high-end  niches  in  non-CNC  machine  tools  remain  in  the  hands  of  the 
Swiss,  Germans  and,  to  a more  limited  extent,  the  Americans.” 
Between  1987  to  1995  the  U.S.  gains  in  machinery  were  mainly  in  integrated  circuits  (up  4.6 
percent)  and  automobiles  (up  3.9  percent),  these  two  categories  accounting  for  almost  75 
percent  of  the  increase  in  U.S.  machinery  exports  as  a  proportion  of  total  exports.  Within 
the  category  of  Japanese  transportation  equipment  exports,  in  1985  30.2  percent  were 
automobiles  (3,278,724  vehicles)  and  another  6.2  percent  were  auto  parts;  in  1995  these 
figures  were  18.2  percent  (2,066,255  vehicles)  and  6.6  percent  respectively.  The  decline  in 
Japanese  exports  reflected  the  Japanese  strategy  of  foreign  direct  investment  in 
automobiles,  either  directly  in  the  United  States  or  in  Southeast  Asian  countries  such  as 
Thailand  and  Indonesia  that  then  exported  automobiles  or  parts  to  the  United  States.  In 
1985  Japanese  automobile  companies  produced  254,000  cars  and  107,000  trucks  in  the 
USA;  in  1995  1,942,OOO  cars  and  414,000  trucks.”  In  1987,  the  leading  U.S.  industry  within 
the  transportation  equipment  category  was  aircraft,  which  represented  5.0  percent  of  all 
exports.  In  1995  aircraft  had  declined  to  2.6  percent  of  U.S.  exports  to  Japan,  and  had  been 
surpassed  by  automobiles,  which  in  were  4.2  percent  of  U.S.  exports  (294,874  vehicles),  up 
from  only  0.3  percent  (88,395  vehicles)  in  1987. 
It  was  mainly  Japanese  companies  operating  in  the  United  States  that  were  doing  the 
exporting.  Of  just  over  100,OO  automobiles  exported  from  the  United  States  to  Japan  in 
1994,  53,500  were  from  Honda,  USA  and  another  11,300  from  Toyota  USA,  leaving  about 
35  percent  of  the  exports  to  be  shared  between  GM,  Ford,  and  Chrysler  (some  of  whose 
cars  were  produced  through  joint  ventures  with  Japanese  companies).  The  total  number  of 
cars  exported  to  Japan  by  the  three  U.S.  automakers  was  less  than  the  number  exported  by 
Volkswagen/Audi  and  only  about  60  percent  of  the  combined  sales  of  BMW  and  Mercedes 
Benz  in  Japan.  Each  of  the  U.S.  companies  was  also  outsold  in  Japan  by  Rover,  Opel 
(owned  by  GM),  and  VOIVO.‘~ 
The  United  States  and  Japan  almost  balance  trade  within  the  classification  “aircraft  engines 
and  parts”.”  U.S.  exports  of  internal  combustion  engines  to  Japan  increased  from  288 
engines  worth  $0.8  billion  in  1987  to  788  engines  worth  $0.9  billion  in  1995.  But, 
increasingly  parts  dominate  the  trade  in  aircraft  engines,  especially  from  Japan  to  the  United 
States.  The  ability  to  integrate  innovation  in  advanced  materials  with  precision  engineering 
has  been  key  to  Japan’s  growing  success.  Building  on  pioneering  investments  in  the 
development  of  polyacryonitric  carbon  fiber  by  Toray  Industries  in  the  1970s  three 
Japanese  synthetic  fiber  producers  now  dominate  60  percent  of the  world  market.”  Finding 
a  market  at  first  as  a  light  and  durable  material  for  sports  equipment  such  as  tennis  rackets 
”  Robert  Forrant,  “Good  Jobs  and the Cutting  Edge: The  U.S. Machine  Tool  Industry  and  Sustainable 
Prosperity,”  Report  to the Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute,  May  1997. 
”  Nikkei  Weekly,  Japan  Economic  Almanac  1996,  151. 
‘9m.,  101,  103. 
*’  Beth Almeida,  “Are  Good  Jobs  Flying  Away?:  U.S. Aircraft  Engine  Manufacturing  and  Sustainable 
Prosperity,”  Report  to the Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute,  May  1997. 
”  Japan  Economic  Almanac  1997, 210;  Kodama,  Emerqinq  Patterns  of Innovation,  59-60.  See also 
Tsuneo  Suzuki,  “Toray  Corporation:  Seeking  First-Mover  Advantage,”  in Takeshi  Yuzawa,  ed. 
Japanese  Business  Success:  The  Evolution  of A Strateqv,  Routledge,  1994. 
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and  golf  clubs,  in  the  1980s  Japanese-made  carbon  fiber  became  a  primary  composite 
material  used  in  both  aircraft  and  engines.  For  example,  Ishikawajima-Harima  Heavy 
Industries  -- one  of the  three  major Japanese  companies  involved  in jet  engine  manufacture 
__  currently  produces  carbon  fiber  blades  for jet engines  made  by General  Electric.  Japan’s 
competitive  advantage  in  producing  such  parts  that  combine  advances  in  chemical  and 
mechanical  engineering  would  seem  to derive  from  its  investments  in  broad  and  deep  skill 
bases. 
Organizational  integration  also  appears  important  in explaining  trade  in  semiconductors.  In 
1995,  Japanese  exports  of  integrated  circuits  accounted  for  6.2  percent  of  all  Japanese 
exports  to  the  United  States  (up  from  1.4  percent  in  1987),  and  hence  represented  one- 
quarter  of  1995  electrical  machinery  exports.  This  bilateral  trade  in  integrated  circuits 
reflects  U.S.  specialization  in  microprocessors  and  Japanese  specialization  in  dynamic 
random  access  memories  (DRAMS)  -- an international  division  of labor  built  on  investments 
in  different  skill  bases  in  the  two  nations.  Describing  the  “lagged  parallel  model”  of  new 
product  development,  pioneered  at  Toshiba  and  subsequently  diffused  to  other  Japanese 
enterprises  as  well  as  U.S.-based  Texas  Instruments,  Okimoto  and  Nishi  have  pointed  out 
that 
the  lagged  parallel  project  model  is  effective  for  work  on  only  certain  types  of 
technology.  It works  for  DRAMS,  SRAM  [sic],  and  other  commodity  chips,  which 
share  highly  predictable  linear  trajectories  of  technological  advancement.  The 
model  is not particularly  well  suited  for products  based  on nonlinear,  highly  volatile 
technological  trajectories,  where  the  parameters  of  research  for  the  next  and 
successive  product  generations  cannot  be  understood  ahead  of time.  Thus  it is 
not  accidental  that  Japanese  companies  have  dominated  in commodity  chips  but 
have  lagged  behind  U.S. companies  in logic  chips,  microprocessors,  and software 
for  applications  and  operating  systems.  The  latter  may  require  a  different, 
perhaps  less  structured,  organizational  approach.82 
As  for computers,  American  success  in PCs and  packaged,  standardized  software  does  not 
mean  that  the  Japanese  have  not been  successful  competitors.  U.S. government  agencies, 
including  the  military,  have  been  buying  supercomputers  from  the  Japanese.  The  success 
of  a  company  like  Toshiba  in  laptop  computers  reflects  Japan’s  long-standing  success  at 
miniaturization,  a  technological  advance  that  requires  the  integration  of  design  and 
manufacturing.  Japan  also  dominates  international  competition  in  liquid  crystal  displays 
(LCDs),  a technology  invented  by  RCA  in  1967,  but  developed  from  the  early  1970s  most 
successfully  by  Sharp  in  a growing  number  of applications.  By  1992,  Sharp  controlled  38 
percent  of the world’s  rapidly  growing  market for LCDsE3 
In the  United  States,  there  is growing  evidence  that  even  in  industries  such  as jet  engines 
and  medical  equipment,  the  trend  in  the  United  States  is  out  of  manufacturing  and  even 
design,  and  into the  low fixed  cost  and  highly  lucrative  business  of servicing  high-technology 
equipment.84  A  recent  hostile  takeover  attempt  of  Giddings  &  Lewis,  the  largest  machine- 
tool  maker  in  the  United  States,  by  another  American  company,  Harnischfeger,  had  as  it 
objective  the  shedding  of  the  target’s  business  of  manufacturing  machine  tools  for  the 
82  Okimoto  and  Nishi,  “R&D  Organization  in Japanese  and American  Semiconductor  Firms,”  197-198. 
83  Kodama,  Emerqinq  Patterns  of Innovation  , 56-58. 
84  Beth Almeida,  “Are  Good  Jobs  Flying  Away?“;  Chris  Tilly,  “The  Diagnostic  Medical  Equipment 
Industry:  What  Prognosis  for Good  Jobs?”  Report to the Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute,  June 
1997. 
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automotive  industry  so  that  the  company  could  focus  on servicing  installed  machinery.85  In 
the  end,  a “white  knight”,  the  German  company,  Thyssen,  acquired  Giddings,  promising  to 
maintain  its  manufacturing  business.  But the  fact  is that  considerable  money  can  be made 
by taking  a reputable  manufacturing  company  and turning  it into a servicing  company. 
Precisely  because  the  United  States  has  been  a  leader  in  industries  such  as jet  engines, 
medical  equipment,  and  machine  tools,  the  nation  has  a huge  accumulation  of experienced 
technical  specialists,  many  of whom  no longer  have  as secure  employment  with  equipment 
producers  as they  had  in the  past.  Some  of these  people  are finding  continued  employment 
servicing  the  equipment  that  the  companies  for which  they  worked  used to both  produce  and 
service.  In  the  past,  they  acquired  these  skills  through  organizational  learning.  But  their 
utilization  of  these  skills  today  confines  them  to  narrow  and  concentrated  functions  that 
removes  them  even  further  from  the  processes  of  organizational  learning  that  will  drive 
innovation  in the future. 
In the  absence  of  indigenous  manufacturing  capability  and  organizational  learning  in  these 
industries,  where  will  the  next  generation  of American  high-technology  service  specialists 
accumulate  new  state-of-the-art  skills?  The  U.S. economy  has  a vast  accumulation  of high- 
technology  skills  that  derives  from  the  organizational  learning  that  took  place  in  managerial 
structures  over  the  past  century,  and  off of which  it can  live,  and  even  innovate,  for  some 
time  into  the  future.  But,  if instead  of using  this  organizational  learning  to  build  broader  and 
deeper  skill  basis,  American  businesses  move  toward  relying  on  even  narrower  and  more 
concentrated  skill  bases,  the  trends  toward  income  inequality  of  the  last  two  decades  will 
continue.  If  I  am  right,  addressing  the  problem  of  income  inequality  in  the  United  States 
means  paying  serious  attention  to  the  comparative  research  agenda  and  the  issues  of 
corporate  employment  and  corporate  governance  that the skill-base  hypothesis  implies. 
*5 “Giddings  Accepts  Buyout  Offer  From Thyssen  of $675  Million,”  Wall Street  Journal,  June  9, 1997 
29 